Political process and government growth: a theoretical and empirical investigation

A striking feature of virtually al western industrialized countries sice the middle of the past century has been the persistent growth of their government sector. From the beginning of the century to the late 1970's, the government expenditures' share of gross national product has increased from 7% to 36% in the U.S., 11% to 40% in the U.K., and 3% to 25% in Japan. In Germany, it went from 7% to 42% (1872-1978), while in France it soared from 11% to 59% (1872-1979). The evolution of the number of government employees followed a similar pattern. In the U.S., for instance, the average annual rate of growth of the government labor force over the period 1899-1974 has been 3.17%, compared to a 1.62% average annual growth rate of the working population. Less quantifiable aspects like the number and scope of regulations also refelct a growing public sector.

Direct Democracy: Protest Catalyst or Protest Alternative?

This paper presents the first investigation of whether direct democracy supplements or undermines the attendance of demonstrations as a form of protest behavior. A first approach assumes that direct democracy is associated with fewer protests, as they function as a valve that integrates voters’ opinions, preferences, and emotions into the political process. A competing hypothesis proposes a positive relationship between direct democracy and this unconventional form of political participation due to educative effects. Drawing on individual data from recent Swiss Electoral Studies, we apply multilevel analysis and estimate a hierarchical model of the effect of the presence as well as the use of direct democratic institutions on individual protest behavior. Our empirical findings suggest that the political opportunity of direct democracy is associated with a lower individual probability to attend demonstrations.

On the road through the Bolivian Amazon: a multi-level land governance analysis of deforestation

Previous studies have shown that collective property rights offer higher flexibility than individual property and improve sustainable community-based forest management. Our case study, carried out in the Beni department of Bolivia, does not contradict this assertion, but shows that collective rights have been granted in areas where ecological contexts and market facilities were less favourable to intensive land use. Previous experiences suggest investigating political processes in order to understand the criteria according to which access rights were distributed. Based on remote sensing and on a multi-level land governance framework, our research confirms that land placed under collective rights, compared to individual property, is less affected by deforestation among Andean settlements. However, analysis of the historical process of land distribution in the area shows that the distribution of property rights is the result of a political process based on economic, spatial, and environmental strategies that are defined by multiple stakeholders. Collective titles were established in the more remote areas and distributed to communities with lower productive potentialities. Land rights are thus a secondary factor of forest cover change which results from diverse political compromises based on population distribution, accessibility, environmental perceptions, and expected production or extraction incomes.

European Public Sphere

Political communication scholars have investigated whether a public sphere emerges that adapts to the new supra- and intergovernmental European reality in the course of European Union integration. Such European public sphere(s) might link EU politics to citizens. The entry discusses not only how such Europeanized public sphere might affect the quality of democracy as well as the political process but also what a European public sphere could look like and how we might measure it. Our empirical knowledge on the existence or nonexistence of a European Public Sphere is summarized in five theses. The article concludes with future paths for research.

Social Inequality in Political Participation: The Dark Sides of Individualisation

Has the participatory gap between social groups widened over the past decades? And if so, how can it be explained? Based on a re-analysis of 94 electoral surveys in eight Western European countries between 1956 and 2009, this article shows that the difference in national election turnout between the half of the population with the lowest level of education and the half with the highest has increased. It shows that individualisation – the decline of social integration and social control – is a major cause of this trend. In their electoral choices, citizens with fewer resources – in terms of education – rely more heavily on cues and social control of the social groups to which they belong. Once the ties to these groups loosen, these cues and mobilising norms are no longer as strong as they once were, resulting in an increasing abstention of the lower classes on Election Day. In contrast, citizens with abundant resources rely much less on cues and social control, and the process of individualisation impacts on their participatory behaviour to a much lesser extent. The article demonstrates this effect based on a re-analysis of five cumulative waves of the European Social Survey.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.

Dealing with bad guys: actor- and process-level determinants of the “devil shift” in policy making

Policy actors tend to misinterpret and distrust opponents in policy processes. This phenomenon, known as the “devil shift”, consists of the following two dimensions: actors perceive opponents as more powerful and as more evil than they really are. Analysing nine policy processes in Switzerland, this article highlights the drivers of the devil shift at two levels. On the actor level, interest groups, political parties and powerful actors suffer more from the devil shift than state actors and powerless actors. On the process level, the devil shift is stronger in policy processes dealing with socio-economic issues as compared with other issues. Finally, and in line with previous studies, there is less empirical evidence of the power dimension of the devil shift phenomenon than of its evilness dimension.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

Endogenous Development as a Social Learning Process

The author perceives endogenous development as a social learning process, which is constructed by all actors involved. To enhance social learning, a methodology called Autodidactic Learning for sustainability is used, in which the perception of both local actors and external actors are highlighted. Reflecting on differences, conflicts and common interests leads to highly motivated debate and shared reflection, which is almost identical with social learning, and flattens the usual hierarchy between local and external actors. The article shows that the energies generated through collective learning can trigger important technical, social and political changes, which take into account the multiple dimensions of local reality.

Coalition Formation in Parliament and during the Policy Process

In modern democratic systems, usually no single collective actor is able to decisively influence political decision-making. Instead, actors with similar preferences form coalitions in order to gain more influence in the policy process. In the Swiss political system in particular, institutional veto points and the consensual culture of policy-making provide strong incentives for actors to form large coalitions. Coalitions are thus especially important in political decision-making in Switzerland, and are accordingly a central focus of this book. According to one of our core claims - to understand the actual functioning of Swiss consensus democracy - one needs to extend the analysis beyond formal institutions to also include informal procedures and practices. Coalitions of actors play a crucial role in this respect. They are a cornerstone of decision-making structures, and they inform us about patterns of conflict, collaboration and power among actors. Looking at coalitions is all the more interesting in the Swiss political system, since the coalition structure is supposed to vary across policy processes. Given the absence of a fixed government coalition, actors need to form new coalitions in each policy process.