Efficient team actions: Outline of a theory of teams in sport

So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and it's performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate the following presentations is put up for discussion. Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication and co-ordination. From a cognitivist point of view, internal representations (or mental models) guide the behaviour mainly in situations requiring quick reactions and adaptations, were deliberate or contingency planning are difficult. In sport teams, the collective representation contains the elements of the team situation, that is team task and team members, and of the team processes, that is communication and co-operation. Different meta-perspectives may be distinguished and bear a potential to explain the actions of efficient teams. Cranach, M. von, Ochsenbein, G., & Valach, L. (1986).The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

Outline of a theory of efficient teams in Sport.

Introduction So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta-analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and its performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. Objectives In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate research in the domain of team performance and, more specifically, the following presentations, is put up for discussion. Method Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are considered to be information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication processes and co-ordination of individual movements. Especially in rapid interactive sports planning and execution of movements based on feedback loops are not possible. Deliberate planning may be a solution mainly for offensive actions, whereas defensive actions have to adjust to the opponent team's actions. Consequently, mental representations must be developed to allow a feed-forward regulation of team member's actions. Results and Conclusions Some preliminary findings based on this conceptual framework as well as further consequences for empirical investigations will be presented. References Cranach, M.v., Ochsenbein, G. & Valach, L. (1986). The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

Territorial Cohesion through Spatial Policies: An Analysis with Cultural Theory and Clumsy Solutions

The European Territorial Cohesion Policy has been the subject of numerous debates in recent years. Most contributions focus on understanding the term itself and figuring out what is behind it, or arguing for or against a stronger formal competence of the European Union in this field. This article will leave out these aspects and pay attention to (undefined and legally non-binding) conceptual elements of territorial cohesion, focusing on the challenge of linking it within spatial policies and organising the relations. Therefore, the theoretical approach of Cultural Theory and its concept of clumsy solution are applied to overcome the dilemma of typical dichotomies by adding a third and a fourth (but not a fifth) perspective. In doing so, normative contradictions between different rational approaches can be revealed, explained and approached with the concept of ‘clumsy solutions’. This contribution aims at discussing how this theoretical approach helps us explain and frame a coalition between the Territorial Cohesion Policy and spatial policies. This approach contributes to finding the best way of linking and organising policies, although the solution might be clumsy according to the different rationalities involved.

Using negotiated budgets for planning and performance evaluation: An experimental study : an experimental study

Budgets are often simultaneously used for the conflicting purposes of planning and performance evaluation. While economic theory suggests that firms should use separate budgets for conflicting purposes this contrasts with existing evidence that firms rarely do so. We address two open questions related to these observations in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how a planning task that is in conflict with the performance evaluation task affects behavior in budget negotiations and their outcomes. Additionally, we analyze whether a single budget can be effectively used for both purposes compared to two separate budgets. We develop theory to predict that adding a planning task that is in conflict with the superior’s performance evaluation task increases the subordinate’s cooperation in and after the negotiation of a performance evaluation budget. Moreover, we predict that subordinate cooperation increases even more when the superior is restricted to use a single budget for both purposes. Our results broadly support our hypotheses. Specifically, we find that when budgets are used for both planning and performance evaluation, this increases the subordinate’s budget proposals during the negotiation and his performance after the negotiation. These effects tend to be even larger when the superior is restricted to a single budget rather than separate budgets for planning and performance evaluation, particularly with respect to subordinate performance. In our experimental setting, the benefits of increased subordinate cooperation even more than offset the loss in flexibility from the superior’s restriction to a single budget. The results of this study add to the understanding of the interdependencies of conflicting budgeting purposes and contribute to explain why firms often use a single budget for multiple purposes.