Capitalisation of Experiences of the Swiss Support to Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (SMNR) in Bulgaria

Following the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Bulgaria has undergone dramatic political, economic and social transformations. The transition process of the past two decades was characterized by several reforms to support democratisation of the political system and the functioning of a free-market economy. Since 1992, Switzerland has been active in Bulgaria providing assistance to the transition process, with support to Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (SMNR) starting in 1995. The SMNR Capitalisation of Experiences (CapEx) took place between March and September 2007, in the context of SDC phasing out its programmes in Bulgaria by the end of 2007 due to the country’s accession to the European Union. The CapEx exercise has culminated in the identification of 17 lessons learned. In the view of the CapEx team, many of these lessons are relevant for countries that are in the process of joining the EU, facing similar democratisation challenges as Bulgaria. Overall, the Swiss SMNR projects have been effective entry points to support areas that are crucial to democratic transitions, namely participation in public goods management, decentralisation, human capacity development in research and management, and preparation for EU membership. The specificity of the Swiss support stems from an approach that combines a long-term commitment with a clear thematic focus (forestry, biodiversity conservation and organic agriculture). The multistakeholder approach and diversification of support between local, regional and national levels are also important elements that contributed to make a difference in relation to other donors supporting the Bulgarian transition. At the institutional level, there are a number of challenges where the contribution of SMNR activities was only modest, namely improving the legal framework and creating more transparency and accountability, both of which are time and resource-consuming processes. In addition, the emergence of competent and sustainable non-government organisations (NGOs) is a complex process that requires support to membership based organisations, a challenge that was hardly met in the case of SMNR. Finally, reform of government institutions involved in management of natural resources is difficult to achieve via project support only, as it requires leverage and commitment at the level of policy dialogue. At the programme management level, the CapEx team notes that corruption was not systematically addressed in SMNR projects, indicating that more attention should be given to this issue at the outset of any new project.

Minimum carbon payment along an aridity gradient for dryland afforestation in non annex I countries with stochastic weather and prices

Recent findings demonstrate that trees in deserts are efficient carbon sinks. It remains however unknown whether the Clean Development Mechanism will accelerate the planting of trees in Non Annex I dryland countries. We estimated the price of carbon at which a farmer would be indifferent between his customary activity and the planting of trees to trade carbon credits, along an aridity gradient. Carbon yields were simulated by means of the CO2FIX v3.1 model for Pinus halepensis with its respective yield classes along the gradient (Arid – 100mm to Dry Sub Humid conditions – 900mm). Wheat and pasture yields were predicted on somewhat similar nitrogen-based quadratic models, using 30 years of weather data to simulate moisture stress. Stochastic production, input and output prices were afterwards simulated on a Monte Carlo matrix. Results show that, despite the high levels of carbon uptake, carbon trading by afforesting is unprofitable anywhere along the gradient. Indeed, the price of carbon would have to raise unrealistically high, and the certification costs would have to drop significantly, to make the Clean Development Mechanism worthwhile for non annex I dryland countries farmers. From a government agency's point of view the Clean Development Mechanism is attractive. However, such agencies will find it difficult to demonstrate “additionality”, even if the rule may be somewhat flexible. Based on these findings, we will further discuss why the Clean Development Mechanism, a supposedly pro-poor instrument, fails to assist farmers in Non Annex I dryland countries living at minimum subsistence level.

Estimating market access in non-GPA countries: A suggested methodology

The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has data reporting obligations for all its Contracting Parties. Submitting such data promotes transparency in public procurement and also signals tendencies towards discrimination. However, most developing countries, especially emerging economies, are non-members of the GPA and therefore have no comparable data reporting obligations. In most cases, this has led to an absence of any reliable data on these countries’ public purchases, which poses a serious challenge in international negotiations on the subject and in examining the impact of protectionist measures in these countries’ public markets. In this short paper, we attempt to overcome these data challenges by developing a methodology to estimate the size of procurement markets in non-GPA countries as well as foreign market access therein. We also show the results from this methodology for estimating the EU’s access in select emerging economies’ public markets.