Professionalisation of sport federations. A multi-level framework for analysing forms, causes and consequences

Research question: International and national sport federations as well as their member organisations (usually sport clubs) are key actors within the sport system and have a wide range of relationships outside the sport system (e.g. with the state, sponsors, and the media). They are currently facing major challenges such as growing competition in top-level sports, democratisation of sports with “sports for all” and sports as the answer to social problems (integration, education, health, unemployment, etc.). In this context, professionalising sport organisations seems to be an appropriate strategy to face these challenges and solve current problems. We define the professionalisation of sport organisations as an organisational process of transformation leading towards organisational rationalisation, efficiency and business-like management. This has led to a profound organisational change, particularly within sport federations, characterised by the strengthening of institutional management (managerialism) and the implementation of efficiency-based management instruments and paid staff. Research methods: The goal of this article is to review the international literature and establish a global understanding of and theoretical framework for how sport organisations professionalise and what consequences this may have. Results and Findings: Our multi-level approach based on the social theory of action integrates the current concepts for analysing professionalisation in sport federations. We specify the framework for the following research perspectives: (1) forms, (2) causes and (3) consequences, and discuss the reciprocal relations between sport federations and their member organisations in this context. Implications: Finally, we derive general methodological consequences for the investigation of professionalisation processes in sport organisations.

Anamorphic pixels for multi-channel superresolution

Superresolution from plenoptic cameras or camera arrays is usually treated similarly to superresolution from video streams. However, the transformation between the low-resolution views can be determined precisely from camera geometry and parallax. Furthermore, as each low-resolution image originates from a unique physical camera, its sampling properties can also be unique. We exploit this option with a custom design of either the optics or the sensor pixels. This design makes sure that the sampling matrix of the complete system is always well-formed, enabling robust and high-resolution image reconstruction. We show that simply changing the pixel aspect ratio from square to anamorphic is sufficient to achieve that goal, as long as each camera has a unique aspect ratio. We support this claim with theoretical analysis and image reconstruction of real images. We derive the optimal aspect ratios for sets of 2 or 4 cameras. Finally, we verify our solution with a camera system using an anamorphic lens.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Professionalisation of sport federations – A multi-level framework for analysing forms, causes and consequences

Research question: International and national sport federations as well as their member organisations are key actors within the sport system and have a wide range of relationships outside the sport system (e.g. with the state, sponsors, and the media). They are currently facing major challenges such as growing competition in top-level sports, democratisation of sports with ‘sports for all’ and sports as the answer to social problems. In this context, professionalising sport organisations seems to be an appropriate strategy to face these challenges and current problems. We define the professionalisation of sport organisations as an organisational process of transformation leading towards organisational rationalisation, efficiency and business-like management. This has led to a profound organisational change, particularly within sport federations, characterised by the strengthening of institutional management (managerialism) and the implementation of efficiency-based management instruments and paid staff. Research methods: The goal of this article is to review the current international literature and establish a global understanding of and theoretical framework for analysing why and how sport organisations professionalise and what consequences this may have. Results and findings: Our multi-level approach based on the social theory of action integrates the current concepts for analysing professionalisation in sport federations. We specify the framework for the following research perspectives: (1) forms, (2) causes and (3) consequences, and discuss the reciprocal relations between sport federations and their member organisations in this context. Implications: Finally, we work out a research agenda and derive general methodological consequences for the investigation of professionalisation processes in sport organisations.

Professionalisation of sports federations – A multi-level framework for analysing forms, causes and consequences

Introduction: International and national sports federations as well as their member organisations (usually sports clubs) are key actors within the sports system and have a wide range of relationships outside the sports system (e.g. with the state, sponsors, and the media). They are currently facing major challenges such as growing competition in top-­‐level sports, democratisation of sports with “sports for all” and sports as the answer to social problems (integration, education, health, unemployment, etc.). In this context, professionalising sports organisations seems to be an appropriate strategy to face these challenges and solve current problems. This has led to a profound organisational change, particularly within sports federations, characterised by the strengthening of institutional management (managerialism) and the implementation of efficiency-­‐based management instruments and paid staff. In this context the questions arise how sports organisations professionalise and what consequences this may have. Theoretical framework: The goal of our presentation is to review the international literature and develop an appropriate concept of professionalisation in sport federations. Our multi-­‐level approach based on social theory of action integrates the current concepts and perspectives for analysing professionalisation in sports federations. We specify the framework for the following research perspectives: (1) forms, (2) causes and mechanisms, (3) consequences and (4) dynamics, and discuss the reciprocal relations between sports federations and their member organisations in this context. When analysing these different research perspectives, it is important to select or elaborate appropriate theoretical concepts to match the general multi-­‐level framework Discussion: The elaborated multi-­‐level framework for analysing professionalisation in sports federations is able to integrate most of the existing theoretical concepts and therefore, the broad range of endogenous as well as exogenous factors that might influence the professionalisation of sports organisations. Based on the theoretical framework, we can identify several consequences for the methodological design of studies intending to analyse the different perspectives of professionalisation in sports organisations: Data have to be collected on the different levels. Not only the forms of professionalisation and relevant structures of the organisations should be taken into account but also important characteristics of the environment (macro level) as well as members or member organisations, particularly key actors who might play a crucial role in gaining an understanding of professionalisation processes in sports organisations. In order to carry out a complex organisational research design, it seems necessary to focus on case studies – an approach that has become increasingly important in organisational research. Different strategies and methods of data collection have to be used within the case studies (e.g. interviews with experts within the organisations, questionnaire for selected people in the organisation, document analysis). Therefore, qualitative and quantitative research strategies have to be combined.