Book Review: Regulating Code : Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age

Digital technologies have profoundly changed not only the ways we create, distribute, access, use and re-use information but also many of the governance structures we had in place. Overall, "older" institutions at all governance levels have grappled and often failed to master the multi-faceted and multi-directional issues of the Internet. Regulatory entrepreneurs have yet to discover and fully mobilize the potential of digital technologies as an influential factor impacting upon the regulability of the environment and as a potential regulatory tool in themselves. At the same time, we have seen a deterioration of some public spaces and lower prioritization of public objectives, when strong private commercial interests are at play, such as most tellingly in the field of copyright. Less tangibly, private ordering has taken hold and captured through contracts spaces, previously regulated by public law. Code embedded in technology often replaces law. Non-state action has in general proliferated and put serious pressure upon conventional state-centered, command-and-control models. Under the conditions of this "messy" governance, the provision of key public goods, such as freedom of information, has been made difficult or is indeed jeopardized.The grand question is how can we navigate this complex multi-actor, multi-issue space and secure the attainment of fundamental public interest objectives. This is also the question that Ian Brown and Chris Marsden seek to answer with their book, Regulating Code, as recently published under the "Information Revolution and Global Politics" series of MIT Press. This book review critically assesses the bold effort by Brown and Marsden.

Computed tomography (CT) virtual autopsy and classical autopsy discrepancies: radiologist's error or a demonstration of post-mortem multi-detector computed tomography (MDCT) limitation?

Modern imaging technologies, such as computed tomography (CT) techniques, represent a great challenge in forensic pathology. The field of forensics has experienced a rapid increase in the use of these new techniques to support investigations on critical cases, as indicated by the implementation of CT scanning by different forensic institutions worldwide. Advances in CT imaging techniques over the past few decades have finally led some authors to propose that virtual autopsy, a radiological method applied to post-mortem analysis, is a reliable alternative to traditional autopsy, at least in certain cases. The authors investigate the occurrence and the causes of errors and mistakes in diagnostic imaging applied to virtual autopsy. A case of suicide by a gunshot wound was submitted to full-body CT scanning before autopsy. We compared the first examination of sectional images with the autopsy findings and found a preliminary misdiagnosis in detecting a peritoneal lesion by gunshot wound that was due to radiologist's error. Then we discuss a new emerging issue related to the risk of diagnostic failure in virtual autopsy due to radiologist's error that is similar to what occurs in clinical radiology practice.

Multi-Model Data Fusion to Improve an Early Warning System for Hypo-/Hyperglycemic Events

Correct predictions of future blood glucose levels in individuals with Type 1 Diabetes (T1D) can be used to provide early warning of upcoming hypo-/hyperglycemic events and thus to improve the patient's safety. To increase prediction accuracy and efficiency, various approaches have been proposed which combine multiple predictors to produce superior results compared to single predictors. Three methods for model fusion are presented and comparatively assessed. Data from 23 T1D subjects under sensor-augmented pump (SAP) therapy were used in two adaptive data-driven models (an autoregressive model with output correction - cARX, and a recurrent neural network - RNN). Data fusion techniques based on i) Dempster-Shafer Evidential Theory (DST), ii) Genetic Algorithms (GA), and iii) Genetic Programming (GP) were used to merge the complimentary performances of the prediction models. The fused output is used in a warning algorithm to issue alarms of upcoming hypo-/hyperglycemic events. The fusion schemes showed improved performance with lower root mean square errors, lower time lags, and higher correlation. In the warning algorithm, median daily false alarms (DFA) of 0.25%, and 100% correct alarms (CA) were obtained for both event types. The detection times (DT) before occurrence of events were 13.0 and 12.1 min respectively for hypo-/hyperglycemic events. Compared to the cARX and RNN models, and a linear fusion of the two, the proposed fusion schemes represents a significant improvement.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

MASCG: Multi-Atlas Segmentation Constrained Graph method for accurate segmentation of hip CT images

This paper addresses the issue of fully automatic segmentation of a hip CT image with the goal to preserve the joint structure for clinical applications in hip disease diagnosis and treatment. For this purpose, we propose a Multi-Atlas Segmentation Constrained Graph (MASCG) method. The MASCG method uses multi-atlas based mesh fusion results to initialize a bone sheetness based multi-label graph cut for an accurate hip CT segmentation which has the inherent advantage of automatic separation of the pelvic region from the bilateral proximal femoral regions. We then introduce a graph cut constrained graph search algorithm to further improve the segmentation accuracy around the bilateral hip joint regions. Taking manual segmentation as the ground truth, we evaluated the present approach on 30 hip CT images (60 hips) with a 15-fold cross validation. When the present approach was compared to manual segmentation, an average surface distance error of 0.30 mm, 0.29 mm, and 0.30 mm was found for the pelvis, the left proximal femur, and the right proximal femur, respectively. A further look at the bilateral hip joint regions demonstrated an average surface distance error of 0.16 mm, 0.21 mm and 0.20 mm for the acetabulum, the left femoral head, and the right femoral head, respectively.