United we stand, divided we fall: a meta-analysis of experiments on clonal integration and its relationship to invasiveness

Fragmentation and vegetative regeneration from small fragments may contribute to population expansion, dispersal and establishment of new populations of introduced plants. However, no study has systematically tested whether a high capacity of vegetative regeneration is associated with a high degree of invasiveness. For small single-node fragments, the presence of internodes may increase regeneration capacity because internodes may store carbohydrates and proteins that can be used for regeneration. We conducted an experiment with 39 stoloniferous plant species to examine the regeneration capacity of small, single-node fragments with or without attached stolon internodes. We asked (1) whether the presence of stolon internodes increases regeneration from single-node fragments, (2) whether regeneration capacity differs between native and introduced species in China, and (3) whether regeneration capacity is positively associated with plant invasiveness at a regional scale (within China) and at a global scale. Most species could regenerate from single-node fragments, and the presence of internodes increased regeneration rate and subsequent growth and/or asexual reproduction. Regeneration capacity varied greatly among species, but showed no relationship to invasiveness, either in China or globally. High regeneration capacity from small fragments may contribute to performance of clonal plants in general, but it does not appear to explain differences in invasiveness among stoloniferous clonal species.

CompAS: A new approach to commonality and variability analysis with applications in computer assisted orthopaedic surgery

In rapidly evolving domains such as Computer Assisted Orthopaedic Surgery (CAOS) emphasis is often put first on innovation and new functionality, rather than in developing the common infrastructure needed to support integration and reuse of these innovations. In fact, developing such an infrastructure is often considered to be a high-risk venture given the volatility of such a domain. We present CompAS, a method that exploits the very evolution of innovations in the domain to carry out the necessary quantitative and qualitative commonality and variability analysis, especially in the case of scarce system documentation. We show how our technique applies to the CAOS domain by using conference proceedings as a key source of information about the evolution of features in CAOS systems over a period of several years. We detect and classify evolution patterns to determine functional commonality and variability. We also identify non-functional requirements to help capture domain variability. We have validated our approach by evaluating the degree to which representative test systems can be covered by the common and variable features produced by our analysis.

A 4 Mb high resolution BAC contig on bovine chromosome 1q12 and comparative analysis with human chromosome 21q22

The bovine RPCI-42 BAC library was screened to construct a sequence-ready ~4 Mb single contig of 92 BAC clones on BTA 1q12. The contig covers the region between the genes KRTAP8P1 and CLIC6. This genomic segment in cattle is of special interest as it contains the dominant gene responsible for the hornless or polled phenotype in cattle. The construction of the BAC contig was initiated by screening the bovine BAC library with heterologous cDNA probes derived from 12 human genes of the syntenic region on HSA 21q22. Contig building was facilitated by BAC end sequencing and chromosome walking. During the construction of the contig, 165 BAC end sequences and 109 single-copy STS markers were generated. For comparative mapping of 25 HSA 21q22 genes, genomic PCR primers were designed from bovine EST sequences and the gene-associated STSs mapped on the contig. Furthermore, bovine BAC end sequence comparisons against the human genome sequence revealed significant matches to HSA 21q22 and allowed the in silico mapping of two new genes in cattle. In total, 31 orthologues of human genes located on HSA 21q22 were directly mapped within the bovine BAC contig, of which 16 genes have been cloned and mapped for the first time in cattle. In contrast to the existing comparative bovine-human RH maps of this region, these results provide a better alignment and reveal a completely conserved gene order in this 4 Mb segment between cattle, human and mouse. The mapping of known polled linked BTA 1q12 microsatellite markers allowed the integration of the physical contig map with existing linkage maps of this region and also determined the exact order of these markers for the first time. Our physical map and transcript map may be useful for positional cloning of the putative polled gene in cattle.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.