The Role of Goods Trade Networks for Services Trade Volume

In this paper, we address the role of countries’ goods-trade networks for their services-trade volume. The paper employs a large cross section of bilateral trade data on aggregate cross-border goods and services sales and illustrates that the depth and overlap of two countries’ services networks induce a positive direct impact on their services-trade volume. The evidence takes into account that goods trade flows and networks are potentially endogenous so that the estimated direct effects support a causal interpretation. We find that the magnitude of the multilateral goods-trade network effect on the bilateral services-trade volume is much larger than that of bilateral goods-trade volume.

Exploring intra-commonwealth goods and services trade

A background paper for the Commonwealth Secretariat by Anirudh Shingal and Mohammad Razzaque: Existing work examining the trade effect of commonwealth membership does not account for sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity and multilateral resistance in estimation, leading to biased estimates. Our analyses improve on all these fronts. Unlike earlier work, we also consider services trade and assemble a much larger sample of trading partners (242 x 242, over 1995-2010). Commonwealth membership is found to increase goods exports by 18.5-33.2% and services exports by 42.8% in our results, ceteris paribus and on average. Our analyses on the determinants of intra-commonwealth trade suggest the positive role of common language (only for goods trade) and colonial relationships as well as the negative impact of geography, thereby confirming that commonwealth member states are not natural trading partners for each other. Finally, being one of Australia, Canada or the UK is associated with 98.2% greater merchandise trade than the commonwealth average; however, a similar effect is not observed for services trade.

Exploring complementarities between goods and services trade in trade agreements

More than three decades of research on trade costs and goods trade have unveiled fundamental insights into the determinants, the nature and the consequences of goods trade agreements. A cottage literature has also evolved studying similar issues from a services trade perspective, but the two-way interaction between goods and services trade has not been explored formally. We bridge this gap by providing a formal treatment of the inter-linkages between goods and services trade. The model provides insights into how trade agreements impact goods and services trade. We also explore the impact of the complementarities of goods and services agreements on goods and services trade empirically using bilateral goods and services trade data for OECD and BRICS trading partners over 1995-2010.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

To fuse or not to fuse? Assessing the case for convergent disciplines on goods and services trade

Think piece by Pierre Sauvé for the E15 Initiative on Strengthening the Global Trade System In his latest essay for the ICTSD-World Economic Forum E15 initiative on Strengthening the Global Trade and Investment System for Sustainable Development, WTI Director of External Programmes and Academic Partnerships and faculty member Pierre Sauvé explores the case for fusing the law of goods with that of services in a world of global value chains. The paper does so by directing attention to the questions of whether the current architectures of multilateral and preferential trade governance are compatible with a world of trade in tasks; whether the existing rules offer globally active firms a coherent structure for doing business in a predictable environment; whether it is feasible to redesign the structure and content of existing trade rules to align them to the reality of production fragmentation; and what steps can be envisaged to better align policy and realities in the marketplace if the prospects for restructuring appear unfavourable. The paper argues that fusing trade disciplines for goods and services is neither needed nor feasible and may actually deflect attention from a number of worthwhile policy initiatives where more realistic (if never easily secured) prospects of generic rule-making may well exist.

A "Beyond WTO" Scenario for Swiss Agriculture: Consequences for Income Generation and the Provision of Public Goods

The conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations is likely to influence Swiss agricultural policy substantially. The same goes for a free trade agreement in agriculture and food with the European Communities. Even though neither of them will bring about duty-free and quota-free market access, or restrict domestic support measures to green box compatible support, both would represent a big step in that direction. There is no empirical evidence on the effect of such a counterfactual scenario for Swiss agriculture. We therefore use a normative mathematical programming model to illustrate possible effects for agricultural production and the corresponding agricultural income. Moreover, we discuss the results with respect to the provision of public goods under the assumption of continuing green box-compatible direct payments. The aim of our article is to bring more transparency into the discussion on the effects of freer and less distorted trade on the income generation by a multifunctional agriculture. The article will be organized as follows. In the first Section we specify the background of our study. In the second section, we focus on the problem statement and our research questions. In Section 3, we describe in detail a counterfactual scenario of “duty-free, quota-free and price support-free” agriculture from an economic as well as a legal perspective. Our methodology and the results are presented in Section 4 and 5 respectively. In Section 6, we discuss our results with respect to economic and legal aspects of multifunctional agriculture.

The Trade Versus Culture Discourse: Tracing its Evolution in Global Law

The intensified flows of goods, services, peoples and ideas across borders intrinsic to globalization have had numerous and multi-faceted effects. Those affecting culture have been perhaps the most controversial, as it is more often than not difficult to identify the spill-overs across economic and non-economic areas and across borders, as it is equally hard to qualify the effects of these spill-overs as positive or negative. The debate also tends to be politically and even emotionally charged, which has so far not proven advantageous to establishing a genuine dialogue, nor to finding solutions. This contention and the divergent interests of major players in the international community have been reflected in the institutions and rules of global law. It is the objective of this chapter to explore this institutional architecture, in particular its main (and opposing) constituent fora of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The chapter traces the evolution of these institutions and their interaction over time, as well as the underlying objectives, demands and strategies of the key proponents in the trade versus culture discourse, which ultimately shaped the existent law and policy. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of the present state of affairs situating the discussion into the contemporary global governance landscape.

Should There Be New Multilateral Rules for Digital Trade?

The Internet revolution and the digital environment have spurred a significant amount of innovative activity that has had spillover effects on many sectors of the economy. For a growing group of countries – both developed and developing – digital goods and services have become an important engine of economic growth and a clear priority in their future-oriented economic strategies. Neither the rapid technological developments associated with digitization, nor their increased societal significance have so far been reflected in international economic law in a comprehensive manner. The law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular, has not reacted in any proactive manner. A pertinent question that arises is whether the WTO rules are still useful and able to accommodate the new digital economy or whether they have been rendered outdated and incapable of dealing with this important development? The present think-piece seeks answers to these questions and maps the key issues and challenges which the WTO faces. In appraisal of the current state of affairs, developments in venues other than the WTO, and proposals tabled by stakeholders, some recommendations for the ways forward are made.

The European Union, the World Trade Organization and Cultural Diversity

The chapter maps these trade versus culture developments in the WTO and the positions of the European Union (EU or the Union) and its member states, which were not always coherent. It also looks at the actual results of the trade versus culture contestation – that is, the rules on trade in goods and services in the WTO and how they reflect the need for more policy space in matters of cultural policy, which the EU so ardently pressed for. The chapter further analyses the evolution of both the international trade regulation and the discourse on cultural policy. This discourse has in fact undergone a major transformation in the last two decades, as it has moved from the ‘exception culturelle’ rhetoric, which dominated the Uruguay trade talks, towards a more positive but also more pro-active agenda under the slogan of cultural diversity. The EU has been a major driver of this transformation, which has succeeded in mobilising the international community and ultimately led to the adoption of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The chapter concludes by appraisal of the current state of the debate situating it into the broader picture of contemporary global governance. It asks how the EU could effectively pursue its cultural policy aspirations and endorse its cultural diversity agenda in a world of complexity and rapid technological change, in particular in view of the affordances of digital media.

Towards a new balance of trade in agriculture

Trade in agriculture is linked to a whole range of economic, environmental, societal and future interests. For this reason, international regulation of trade in agricultural goods is highly contentious. While mainly directed towards an opening of markets, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture also has some entry points for ‘non trade concerns’. However, the agreement still looks like a casual patchwork that allows rather unsystematic ally for exemptions, without explicitly exposing the grounds that allow for them. The question arises of how the agreement could be drafted in a more structured way, in order to make sure that the economic objectives are efficiently pursued, and at the same time that human rights and environmental concerns are adequately taken account of? The concept of sustainable development provides for a methodical ‘seven step’ framework that gives guidance on integrated decision making processes. In this paper, this framework is partially applied to the Agreement on Agriculture. This working paper served as an introductory note to a brainstorming workshop on the subject that took place on 27 March 2009 at the World Trade Institute, University of Bern.

Trade Costs, Quality, and The Skill Premium

We develop a monopolistic competition model with nonhomothetic factor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a multicountry dataset we test and confirm the findings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington-apples effect that goods shipped over larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being relatively skill intensive with the Washington-apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill premium in a country by about 2.3 percent.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.

Analysis of the upcoming Modernisation of the Trade Pillar of the European Union-Mexico Global Agreement

Study for the EU Parliament co-authored by Rodrigo Polanco: The 1997 Global Agreement between the EC and its Member States and Mexico, together with the set of decisions taken in its framework, has been effective, and thus modifications of the agreement are mainly motivated by changes in the global landscape since it was first enacted. Therefore, broad considerations on how the European Union (EU) trade policy is shaped are extremely relevant for the upcoming negotiations with Mexico. In this context, the needs and expectations, both from the EU and Mexico, regarding any further agreements are examined, focusing in particular on areas beyond trade in goods and services such as procurement, investment, and regulatory cooperation. It is argued that the 'old' Association Agreements should be taken as models for any modifications, given their emphasis on EU-specific issues and their ability to accommodate the needs of Mexico in any deepened agreement.

Trade Policy, Investment and Migration: The Liberalisation Paradigm

Presentation by Thomas Cottier & Charlotte Sieber-Gasser prepared for the Markets for Migration and Development (M4MD) Conference, Bern, 13-15 September 2011. This presentation is part of Session 1 "Why Trade, Development and Migration?" of the M4MD conference, which was one of the thematic meetings held in the context of the 2011 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) chaired by Switzerland. Session 1 seeked to understand to what extent international trade and foreign direct investment drives migration and why states find it more difficult to liberalise the trans‐boundary movement of persons than to liberalise cross‐border trade in goods and services. One discussed aspect was why globalisation, trade liberalisation and FDI can lead not only to more, but also to less migration and what the corresponding effects on development would be. This Session provided a timely opportunity to broaden the perspective on international migration and explore the interaction between migration, development and trade policymaking.