Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Online social networks: why we disclose

On online social networks such as Facebook, massive self-disclosure by users has attracted the attention of industry players and policymakers worldwide. Despite the impressive scope of this phenomenon, very little is understood about what motivates users to disclose personal information. Integrating focus group results into a theoretical privacy calculus framework, we develop and empirically test a Structural Equation Model of self-disclosure with 259 subjects. We find that users are primarily motivated to disclose information because of the convenience of maintaining and developing relationships and platform enjoyment. Countervailing these benefits, privacy risks represent a critical barrier to information disclosure. However, users’ perception of risk can be mitigated by their trust in the network provider and availability of control options. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations for network providers.

Privacy Policies and Users’ Trust: Does Readability Matter?

Over the years, a drastic increase in online information disclosure spurs a wave of concerns from multiple stakeholders. Among others, users resent the “behind the closed doors” processing of their personal data by companies. Privacy policies are supposed to inform users how their personal information is handled by a website. However, several studies have shown that users rarely read privacy policies for various reasons, not least because limitedly readable policy texts are difficult to understand. Based on our online survey with over 440 responses, we examine the objective and subjective readability of privacy policies and investigate their impact on users’ trust in five big Internet services. Our findings show the stronger a user believes in having understood the privacy policy, the higher he or she trusts a web site across all companies we studied. Our results call for making readability of privacy policies more accessible to an average reader.

Self-disclosure and privacy calculus on social networking sites: the role of culture

Social Networking Sites (SNSs) have become extremely popular around the world. They rely on user-generated content to offer engaging experience to its members. Cultural differences may influence the motivation of users to create and share content on SNS. This study adopts the privacy calculus perspective to examine the role of culture in individual self-disclosure decisions. The authors use structural equation modeling and multi-group analysis to investigate this dynamics. The findings reveal the importance of cultural dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance in the cognitive processes of SNS users.

Online disclosure and privacy concerns: a study of Moroccan and American facebook users

In using online social networks to connect and interact with people has become extremely popular all around the world. Thelargest Social Networking Site (SNS), Facebook, offers its services in over 70 languages and increasingly relies oninternational users to grow its membership. Aiming to understand the role of culture in SNS participation, this study adopts a‘privacy calculus’ perspective to examine the differences in participation patterns between American and MoroccanFacebook users. Survey results show that Moroccans users disclose less on Facebook than US users, yet perceive moredamage should their privacy on Facebook be violated. American users, on the other hand, have lower privacy concerns, trustfellow SNS members and legal system more, and disclose more in their profile. From a practical standpoint, the resultsindicate that SNS providers cannot rely on the same methods to encourage user participation and disclosure in differentcountries.

"It won't happen to me!": self-disclosure in online social networks

Despite the considerable amount of self-disclosure in Online Social Networks (OSN), the motivation behind this phenomenon is still little understood. Building on the Privacy Calculus theory, this study fills this gap by taking a closer look at the factors behind individual self-disclosure decisions. In a Structural Equation Model with 237 subjects we find Perceived Enjoyment and Privacy Concerns to be significant determinants of information revelation. We confirm that the privacy concerns of OSN users are primarily determined by the perceived likelihood of a privacy violation and much less by the expected damage. These insights provide a solid basis for OSN providers and policy-makers in their effort to ensure healthy disclosure levels that are based on objective rationale rather than subjective misconceptions.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.