Swiss Policies for more Food Security

Resource-poor yet blissful Switzerland is also one of the most food-secure countries in the world: there are abundant food supplies, relatively low retail prices in terms of purchasing power parity, with few poverty traps. Domestic production covers 70% of net domestic consumption. A vast and efficient food reserve scheme insures against import disruptions. Nonetheless, the food security contribution by the four sectoral policies involved is mutually constrained: our agriculture is protected by the world’s highest tariffs. Huge subsidies, surface payments, and some production quotas substitute market signals with rent maximisation. Moreover, these inefficiencies also prevent trade and investment policies which would keep markets open, development policies which would provide African farmers with the tools to become more competitive, and supply policies which would work against speculators. The paralysing effect of Swiss agricultural policies is exacerbated by new “food security subsidies” in the name of “food sovereignty” while two pending people’s initiatives might yet increase the splendid isolation which in effect reduce Swiss farmer competitiveness and global food security. Is there a solution? Absent a successful conclusion of the Doha Round (WTO) or a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) further market openings and a consequent “recoupling” of taxpayer support to public goods production remain highly un-likely. To the very minimum Switzerland should resume the agricultural reform process, join other countries trying to prevent predatory behaviour of its investors in developing countries, and regionalise its food reserve.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Legal Framework for Cross-Regional Networks: The Case of Services and Migration

Paper prepared by Marion Panizzon and Charlotte Sieber-Gasser for the International Conference on the Political Economy of Liberalising Trade in Services, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 14-15 June 2010 Recent literature has shed light on the economic potential of cross-border networks. These networks, consisting of expatriates and their acquaintances from abroad and at home, provide the basis for the creation of cross-border value added chains and therewith the means for turning brain drain into brain circulation. Both aspects are potentially valuable for economic growth in the developing world. Unilateral co-development policies operating through co-funding of expatriate business ventures, but also bilateral agreements liberalising circular migration for a limited set of per-sons testify to the increasing awareness of governments about the potential, which expatriate networks hold for economic growth in developing countries. Whereas such punctual efforts are valuable, viewed from a long term perspective, these top-down, government mandated Diaspora stimulation programs, will not replace, this paper argues, the market-driven liberalisation of infrastructure and other services in developing countries. Nor will they carry, in the case of circular labour migration, the political momentum to liberalise labour market admission for those non-nationals, who will eventually emerge as the future transnational entrepreneurs. It will take a combination of mode 4 and infrastructure services openings-cum regulation for countries at both sides of the spectrum to provide the basis and precondition for transnational business and entrepreneurial networks to emerge and translate into cross-border, value added production chains. Two key issues are of particular relevance in this context: (i) the services sector, especially in infrastructure, tends to suffer from inefficiencies, particularly in developing countries, and (ii) labour migration, a highly complex issue, still faces disproportionately rigid barriers despite well-documented global welfare gains. Both are hindrances for emerging markets to fully take advantage of the potential of these cross-border networks. Adapting the legal framework for enhancing the regulatory and institutional frameworks for services trade, especially in infrastructure services sectors (ISS) and labour migration could provide the incentives necessary for brain circulation and strengthen cross-border value added chains by lowering transaction costs. This paper analyses the shortfalls of the global legal framework – the shallow status quo of GATS commitments in ISS and mode 4 particular – in relation to stimulating brain circulation and the creation of cross-border value added chains in emerging markets. It highlights the necessity of adapting the legal framework, both on the global and the regional level, to stimulate broader and wider market access in the four key ISS sectors (telecommunications, transport, professional and financial services) in developing countries, as domestic supply capacity, global competitiveness and economic diversification in ISS sectors are necessary for mobilising expatriate re-turns, both physical and virtual. The paper argues that industrialised, labour receiving countries need to offer mode 4 market access to wider categories of persons, especially to students, graduate trainees and young professionals from abroad. Further-more, free trade in semi-finished products and mode 4 market access are crucial for the creation of cross-border value added chains across the developing world. Finally, the paper discusses on the basis of a case study on Jordan why the key features of trade agreements, which promote circular migration and the creation of cross-border value added chains, consist of trade liberalisation in services and liberal migration policies.