Coalition Structures and Policy Change in a Consensus Democracy

This paper studies the relation between coalition structures in policy processes and policy change. While different factors such as policy images, learning processes, external events, or venue shopping are important to explain policy change, coalition structures within policy processes are often neglected. However, policy change happens as a result of negotiations and coordination among coalitions within policy processes. The paper analyzes how conflict, collaboration, and power relations among coalitions of actors influence policy change in an institutional context of a consensus democracy. Empirically, I rely on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to conduct a cross-sector comparison of the 11 most important policy processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006. Coalition structures with low conflict and strong collaboration among coalitions as well as structures with dominant coalitions and weak collaboration both facilitate major policy change. Competing coalitions that are separated by strong conflict but still collaborate strongly produce policy outputs that are close to the status quo.

Beyond a logic of effectiveness: Horizontal coordination, democratic legitimacy and accountability

Horizontal coordination, where actors join together to accomplish a common task, has been applauded for its output legitimacy. However, such processes often face challenges due to opposition from local actors who raise concerns about democratic legitimacy and accountability. Moving beyond a logic of effectiveness, we aim to show how and why other forms of legitimacy such as input and throughput dimensions also affect horizontal coordination, in addition to output criteria. Beyond the assumed positive relationship between coordination and effectiveness, we additionally expect horizontal coordination to be (a) impeded by local actors' fear of losing democratic legitimacy; and (b) fostered by accountability in terms of the steering capacity of the state. A comparative case study analysis of water supply structures at the regional level in Switzerland shows, in contrast to our expectation, that effectiveness has mixed impacts on horizontal coordination. Rather than being solely a positive factor for horizontal coordination, certain output criteria such as financial redistribution are found to be a key hindrance. We also find that democratic legitimacy may, indeed, impede horizontal coordination whereas increased accountability positively affects such coordination.

Strengthening the Migration-Development Nexus through Improved Policy and Institutional Coherence

The complexity of migration issues is clearly reflected by states diverging national migration policy interests that exists within one state. In line with the Swiss Report on International Cooperation on Migration of the Swiss Federal Council , this complexity requires close coordination and cooperation between the governmental institutions and all offices. Only through a close and coherent cooperation between all governmental actors involved in migration issues the migration-development nexus can be strength. The present paper will suggest how intergovernmental cooperation can lead to better policy coherence in migration by interlinking all actors involved.