Safety of Active Implantable Devices during MRI Examinations: A Finite Element Analysis of an Implantable Pump

The goal of this study was to propose a general numerical analysis methodology to evaluate the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)-safety of active implants. Numerical models based on the finite element (FE) technique were used to estimate if the normal operation of an active device was altered during MRI imaging. An active implanted pump was chosen to illustrate the method. A set of controlled experiments were proposed and performed to validate the numerical model. The calculated induced voltages in the important electronic components of the device showed dependence with the MRI field strength. For the MRI radiofrequency fields, significant induced voltages of up to 20 V were calculated for a 0.3T field-strength MRI. For the 1.5 and 3.0T MRIs, the calculated voltages were insignificant. On the other hand, induced voltages up to 11 V were calculated in the critical electronic components for the 3.0T MRI due to the gradient fields. Values obtained in this work reflect to the worst case situation which is virtually impossible to achieve in normal scanning situations. Since the calculated voltages may be removed by appropriate protection circuits, no critical problems affecting the normal operation of the pump were identified. This study showed that the proposed methodology helps the identification of the possible incompatibilities between active implants and MR imaging, and can be used to aid the design of critical electronic systems to ensure MRI-safety

Dilution of candidates: the case of iron-related genes in restless legs syndrome

Restless legs syndrome (RLS) is a common multifactorial disease. Some genetic risk factors have been identified. RLS susceptibility also has been related to iron. We therefore asked whether known iron-related genes are candidates for association with RLS and, vice versa, whether known RLS-associated loci influence iron parameters in serum. RLS/control samples (n = 954/1814 in the discovery step, 735/736 in replication 1, and 736/735 in replication 2) were tested for association with SNPs located within 4 Mb intervals surrounding each gene from a list of 111 iron-related genes using a discovery threshold of P = 5 × 10(-4). Two population cohorts (KORA F3 and F4 with together n = 3447) were tested for association of six known RLS loci with iron, ferritin, transferrin, transferrin-saturation, and soluble transferrin receptor. Results were negative. None of the candidate SNPs at the iron-related gene loci was confirmed significantly. An intronic SNP, rs2576036, of KATNAL2 at 18q21.1 was significant in the first (P = 0.00085) but not in the second replication step (joint nominal P-value = 0.044). Especially, rs1800652 (C282Y) in the HFE gene did not associate with RLS. Moreover, SNPs at the known RLS loci did not significantly affect serum iron parameters in the KORA cohorts. In conclusion, the correlation between RLS and iron parameters in serum may be weaker than assumed. Moreover, in a general power analysis, we show that genetic effects are diluted if they are transmitted via an intermediate trait to an end-phenotype. Sample size formulas are provided for small effect sizes.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.

Non-tariff barriers, integration and the transatlantic economy

We examine the potential impact of TTIP through trade-cost reductions, applying a mix of econometric and computational methods to develop estimates of the benefits (and costs) for the EU, United States, and third countries. Econometric results point to an approximate 80% growth in bilateral trade with an ambitious trade agreement. However, at the same time, computable general equilibrium (CGE) estimates highlight distributional impacts across countries and factors not evident from econometrics alone. Translated through our CGE framework, while bilateral trade increases roughly 80%, there is a fall of about 2.5% in trade with the rest of the world in our central case. The estimated gains in annual consumption range between 1% and 2.25% for the United States and EU, respectively. A purely discriminatory agreement would harm most countries outside the agreement, while the direction of third-country effects hinges critically on whether NTB reductions end up being discriminatory or not. Within the United States and EU, while labour gains across skill categories, the impact on farmers is mixed.

Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions

Exchange between anonymous actors in Internet auctions corresponds to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma-like situation. Therefore, in any given auction the risk is high that seller and buyer will cheat and, as a consequence, that the market will collapse. However, mutual cooperation can be attained by the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this system, sellers have incentives to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we empirically explore the effects of the reputation system. In general, the analysis of nonobtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation, and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimates of effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions such as the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the selling price (highest bid). In particular, we try to answer the question whether sellers receive a "premium" for reputation. Our results show that buyers are willing to pay higher prices for reputation in order to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves from cheating buyers by the choice of an appropriate payment mode. Therefore, despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior, simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets.

Learning styles vary among general surgery residents: analysis of 12 years of data

PURPOSE: Understanding the learning styles of individuals may assist in the tailoring of an educational program to optimize learning. General surgery faculty and residents have been characterized previously as having a tendency toward particular learning styles. We seek to understand better the learning styles of general surgery residents and differences that may exist within the population. METHODS: The Kolb Learning Style Inventory was administered yearly to general surgery residents at the University of Cincinnati from 1994 to 2006. This tool allows characterization of learning styles into 4 groups: converging, accommodating, assimilating, and diverging. The converging learning style involves education by actively solving problems. The accommodating learning style uses emotion and interpersonal relationships. The assimilating learning style learns by abstract logic. The diverging learning style learns best by observation. Chi-square analysis and analysis of variance were performed to determine significance. RESULTS: Surveys from 1994 to 2006 (91 residents, 325 responses) were analyzed. The prevalent learning style was converging (185, 57%), followed by assimilating (58, 18%), accommodating (44, 14%), and diverging (38, 12%). At the PGY 1 and 2 levels, male and female residents differed in learning style, with the accommodating learning style being relatively more frequent in women and assimilating learning style more frequent in men (Table 1, p < or = 0.001, chi-square test). Interestingly, learning style did not seem to change with advancing PGY level within the program, which suggests that individual learning styles may be constant throughout residency training. If a resident's learning style changed, it tended to be to converging. In addition, no relation exists between learning style and participation in dedicated basic science training or performance on the ABSIT/SBSE. CONCLUSIONS: Our data suggests that learning style differs between male and female general surgery residents but not with PGY level or ABSIT/SBSE performance. A greater understanding of individual learning styles may allow more refinement and tailoring of surgical programs.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.