Population genomic tests of models of adaptive radiation in Lake Victoria Region cichlid fish

Adaptive radiation is usually thought to be associated with speciation, but the evolution of intraspecific polymorphisms without speciation is also possible. The radiation of cichlid fish in Lake Victoria (LV) is perhaps the most impressive example of a recent rapid adaptive radiation, with 600+ very young species. Key questions about its origin remain poorly characterized, such as the importance of speciation versus polymorphism, whether species persist on evolutionary time scales, and if speciation happens more commonly in small isolated or in large connected populations. We used 320 individuals from 105 putative species from Lakes Victoria, Edward, Kivu, Albert, Nabugabo and Saka, in a radiation-wide amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP) genome scan to address some of these questions. We demonstrate pervasive signatures of speciation supporting the classical model of adaptive radiation associated with speciation. A positive relationship between the age of lakes and the average genomic differentiation of their species, and a significant fraction of molecular variance explained by above-species level taxonomy suggest the persistence of species on evolutionary time scales, with radiation through sequential speciation rather than a single starburst. Finally the large gene diversity retained from colonization to individual species in every radiation suggests large effective population sizes and makes speciation in small geographical isolates unlikely.

Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What this Means for the Simulation Argument

N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we are likely to live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies.