Dimensions of culture in intra-cultural comparisons: Individualism/collectivism and family-related values in three generations

The goal of the present study is to supplement inter-cultural comparison of values as a cultural dimension by intra-cultural comparisons, and to go beyond comparisons of single values representing cultural dimensions by studying value patterns on the individual level. Therefore, relationships among general (individualism, collectivism) and domain-specific (family- and child-related) values and the transmission of values in three generations of one family were analyzed. The sample consisted of 100 complete triads of three generations (grandmothers, mothers, and adolescents). The results showed that the individual value orientations of these three generations dif- fered in the expected direction. Individualistic values were more supported by the younger and less by the older generation. While individualism did not show significant relations to other specific values, collectivism was the most powerful dimension to predict family and child-related values. Individual- ism and collectivism clearly turned out as separate dimensions with different functions for the individual value system. The value structure of grandmoth- ers as compared to the younger generations showed more internal consistency. A relative transmission of values was obvious for the adjacent generations. The results are discussed from the perspective of cultural change and stability, and the relation among cultural dimensions and individual value orientations.

Are We Sims? How Computer Simulations Represent and What this Means for the Simulation Argument

N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we are likely to live in a computer simulation. The argument is based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simulation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the simulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hardware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather than, say, galaxies.