Efficacy of experimental treatments compared with standard treatments in non-inferiority trials: a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials

Background There is concern that non-inferiority trials might be deliberately designed to conceal that a new treatment is less effective than a standard treatment. In order to test this hypothesis we performed a meta-analysis of non-inferiority trials to assess the average effect of experimental treatments compared with standard treatments. Methods One hundred and seventy non-inferiority treatment trials published in 121 core clinical journals were included. The trials were identified through a search of PubMed (1991 to 20 February 2009). Combined relative risk (RR) from meta-analysis comparing experimental with standard treatments was the main outcome measure. Results The 170 trials contributed a total of 175 independent comparisons of experimental with standard treatments. The combined RR for all 175 comparisons was 0.994 [95% confidence interval (CI) 0.978–1.010] using a random-effects model and 1.002 (95% CI 0.996–1.008) using a fixed-effects model. Of the 175 comparisons, experimental treatment was considered to be non-inferior in 130 (74%). The combined RR for these 130 comparisons was 0.995 (95% CI 0.983–1.006) and the point estimate favoured the experimental treatment in 58% (n = 76) and standard treatment in 42% (n = 54). The median non-inferiority margin (RR) pre-specified by trialists was 1.31 [inter-quartile range (IQR) 1.18–1.59]. Conclusion In this meta-analysis of non-inferiority trials the average RR comparing experimental with standard treatments was close to 1. The experimental treatments that gain a verdict of non-inferiority in published trials do not appear to be systematically less effective than the standard treatments. Importantly, publication bias and bias in the design and reporting of the studies cannot be ruled out and may have skewed the study results in favour of the experimental treatments. Further studies are required to examine the importance of such bias.

Finite element analysis of aortic root dilation: a new procedure to reproduce pathology based on experimental data

Sinotubular junction dilation is one of the most frequent pathologies associated with aortic root incompetence. Hence, we create a finite element model considering the whole root geometry; then, starting from healthy valve models and referring to measures of pathological valves reported in the literature, we reproduce the pathology of the aortic root by imposing appropriate boundary conditions. After evaluating the virtual pathological process, we are able to correlate dimensions of non-functional valves with dimensions of competent valves. Such a relation could be helpful in recreating a competent aortic root and, in particular, it could provide useful information in advance in aortic valve sparing surgery.

Segregation analysis of overweight body condition in an experimental cat population

The goal of this study was to analyze the mode of inheritance of an overweight body condition in an experimental cat population. The cat population consisted of 95 cats of which 81 cats could be clearly classified into lean or overweight using the body condition scoring system according to Laflamme. The lean or overweight classification was then used for segregation analyses. Complex segregation analyses were employed to test for the significance of one environmental and 4 genetic models (general, mixed inheritance, major gene, and polygene). The general genetic model fit the data significantly better than the environmental model (P of the overweight phenotype best. This is the first study in which a genetic component could be shown to be responsible for the development of overweight in cats.

Resource-allocation capabilities of commercial project management software. An experimental analysis

When project managers determine schedules for resource-constrained projects, they commonly use commercial project management software packages. Which resource-allocation methods are implemented in these packages is proprietary information. The resource-allocation problem is in general computationally difficult to solve to optimality. Hence, the question arises if and how various project management software packages differ in quality with respect to their resource-allocation capabilities. None of the few existing papers on this subject uses a sizeable data set and recent versions of common software packages. We experimentally analyze the resource-allocation capabilities of Acos Plus.1, AdeptTracker Professional, CS Project Professional, Microsoft Office Project 2007, Primavera P6, Sciforma PS8, and Turbo Project Professional. Our analysis is based on 1560 instances of the precedence- and resource-constrained project scheduling problem RCPSP. The experiment shows that using the resource-allocation feature of these packages may lead to a project duration increase of almost 115% above the best known feasible schedule. The increase gets larger with increasing resource scarcity and with increasing number of activities. We investigate the impact of different complexity scenarios and priority rules on the project duration obtained by the software packages. We provide a decision table to support managers in selecting a software package and a priority rule.

Experimental Validation of Finite Element Analysis of Human Vertebral Collapse Under Large Compressive Strains

Osteoporosis-related vertebral fractures represent a major health problem in elderly populations. Such fractures can often only be diagnosed after a substantial deformation history of the vertebral body. Therefore, it remains a challenge for clinicians to distinguish between stable and progressive potentially harmful fractures. Accordingly, novel criteria for selection of the appropriate conservative or surgical treatment are urgently needed. Computer tomography-based finite element analysis is an increasingly accepted method to predict the quasi-static vertebral strength and to follow up this small strain property longitudinally in time. A recent development in constitutive modeling allows us to simulate strain localization and densification in trabecular bone under large compressive strains without mesh dependence. The aim of this work was to validate this recently developed constitutive model of trabecular bone for the prediction of strain localization and densification in the human vertebral body subjected to large compressive deformation. A custom-made stepwise loading device mounted in a high resolution peripheral computer tomography system was used to describe the progressive collapse of 13 human vertebrae under axial compression. Continuum finite element analyses of the 13 compression tests were realized and the zones of high volumetric strain were compared with the experiments. A fair qualitative correspondence of the strain localization zone between the experiment and finite element analysis was achieved in 9 out of 13 tests and significant correlations of the volumetric strains were obtained throughout the range of applied axial compression. Interestingly, the stepwise propagating localization zones in trabecular bone converged to the buckling locations in the cortical shell. While the adopted continuum finite element approach still suffers from several limitations, these encouraging preliminary results towardsthe prediction of extended vertebral collapse may help in assessing fracture stability in future work.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Experimental and Theoretical Electron Density Analysis of Copper Pyrazine Nitrate Quasi-Low-Dimensional Quantum Magnets

The accurate electron density distribution and magnetic properties of two metal-organic polymeric magnets, the quasi-one-dimensional (1D) Cu(pyz)(NO3)2 and the quasi-two-dimensional (2D) [Cu(pyz)2(NO3)]NO3·H2O, have been investigated by high-resolution single-crystal X-ray diffraction and density functional theory calculations on the whole periodic systems and on selected fragments. Topological analyses, based on quantum theory of atoms in molecules, enabled the characterization of possible magnetic exchange pathways and the establishment of relationships between the electron (charge and spin) densities and the exchange-coupling constants. In both compounds, the experimentally observed antiferromagnetic coupling can be quantitatively explained by the Cu-Cu superexchange pathway mediated by the pyrazine bridging ligands, via a σ-type interaction. From topological analyses of experimental charge-density data, we show for the first time that the pyrazine tilt angle does not play a role in determining the strength of the magnetic interaction. Taken in combination with molecular orbital analysis and spin density calculations, we find a synergistic relationship between spin delocalization and spin polarization mechanisms and that both determine the bulk magnetic behavior of these Cu(II)-pyz coordination polymers.