Re-Conceptualizing the Global Digital Divide

The article seeks a re-conceptualization of the global digital divide debate. It critically explores the predominant notion, its evolution and measurement, as well as the policies that have been advanced to bridge the digital divide. Acknowledging the complexity of this inequality, the article aims at analyzing the disparities beyond the connectivity and skills barriers. Without understating the first two digital divides, it is argued that as the Internet becomes more sophisticated and more integrated into economic, social, and cultural processes, a “third” generation of divides becomes critical. These divides are drawn not at the entry to the net but within the net itself, and limit access to content. The increasing barriers to content, though of a diverse nature, all relate to some governance characteristics inherent in cyberspace, such as global spillover of local decisions, regulation through code, and proliferation of self- and co-regulatory models. It is maintained that as the practice of intervention intensifies in cyberspace, multiple and far-reaching points of control outside formal legal institutions are created, threatening the availability of public goods and making the pursuit of public objectives difficult. This is an aspect that is rarely addressed in the global digital divide discussions, even in comprehensive analyses and political initiatives such as the World Summit on the Information Society. Yet, the conceptualization of the digital divide as impeded access to content may be key in terms of ensuring real participation and catering for the long-term implications of digital technologies.

Three “Bali Deliverables” for more Food Security

As the clock is ticking for a positive outcome at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference to be held in Bali in December 2013, agricultural negotiators are scrambling to find solutions to issues such as tariff-rate quota (TRQ) administration and export competition in order to improve trade flows. The main issue seems to be whether WTO rules applying to public stockpiles in developing countries need to be changed or temporarily suspended as a means to enhance national food security. This paper is based on a note submitted to the ICTSD-IPC Expert Group “Meeting on Agriculture and Food Security – Policy Options for MC9 and beyond” (Geneva, June 2013). It lists the policy instruments impacting on global, national and (urban and rural) household food security – “The Food Security Tool Box” – and asks which immediate decisions the WTO Ministers might take in this field despite the political difficulties such as continued agro-dumping practices or the “land grab” issue. Three such “deliverables” are outlined: (i) regional and “virtual” food security schemes could be allowed to provide reserves to other countries without violating the obligation to “form an integral part of a food security programme identified in national legislation” (Agreement on Agriculture, Annex II, para 3); (ii) TRQ under-fills could be improved by mandatory enquiries into low fill rate situations; and (iii) World Food Program (WFP) and other non-commercial food purchases could be exempted from export restrictions and prohibitions. High ambitions for Bali seem to be misplaced. A more realistic yet real progress could restore the dwindling credibility of the WTO as a forum for trade negotiations.

The WTO and Food Security: What’s Wrong with the Rules?

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the predominant multilateral legal framework governing agricultural trade. The objective of the AoA is to liberalise trade in agriculture through reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. The AoA has not, however, ‘levelled the playing field’ and has not resulted in the equitable distribution of food, particularly for the poorer developing countries. On the other hand, support for small farmers does not ensure food security for the poor. While food security has no simple solutions such as “free trade is good for you”, reform proposals for trade rules which only address agricultural policy instruments fail to account for consumer and other interests: neither tariff reductions and subsidy disciplines, nor safeguards and other measures of producer protection can automatically increase food security. Rather, what is needed is the full and proper implementation of a number of commitments which the international community has already entered into in various human rights treaties, but which even the envisaged results of the now failed Doha Round negotiations could not ensure without revisiting relevant multilateral trade and investment rules.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

The story of Community preference for food security

"Préférence communautaire" is an in-built notion of the CAP since its inception with the Treaty of Rome (1957). Its’ simple objective laid down at the Stresa Conference in 1958 is to prefer community produce over imports wherever possible, while at the same time promoting agricultural exports and FDI (“vocation exportatrice de l’Europe”). Does this contrast or correlate with the notion of “food sovereignty” which originated in 1996 as a notion of small farmer self-sufficiency (Via Campesina), and which now has found its way into the official EC discourse? Recent CAP reforms indeed seem to continue banking on border protection and on the occasional export subsidy. Nonetheless, coming together with claims to mitigate climate change, “food sovereignty” à la CAP fails to acknowledge efficiency losses at home and negative spillover effects on the right to food of food exporting developing countries. This chapter asks whether new non-tariff and domestic support measures are just new wine in the old cask of fortress Europe, together with the FDI promotion instruments of the FED and others. Might the increasing dynamics and new challenges of agricultural trade and investment lead to lower market and production shares for European farms? It concludes that in the medium term the WTO Green Box has the only legal and effective tools to promote EU agriculture and food.