An interfering Go/No-go task does not affect accuracy in a Concealed Information Test

Following the idea that response inhibition processes play a central role in concealing information, the present study investigated the influence of a Go/No-go task as an interfering mental activity, performed parallel to the Concealed Information Test (CIT), on the detectability of concealed information. 40 undergraduate students participated in a mock-crime experiment and simultaneously performed a CIT and a Go/No-go task. Electrodermal activity (EDA), respiration line length (RLL), heart rate (HR) and finger pulse waveform length (FPWL) were registered. Reaction times were recorded as behavioral measures in the Go/No-go task as well as in the CIT. As a within-subject control condition, the CIT was also applied without an additional task. The parallel task did not influence the mean differences of the physiological measures of the mock-crime-related probe and the irrelevant items. This finding might possibly be due to the fact that the applied parallel task induced a tonic rather than a phasic mental activity, which did not influence differential responding to CIT items. No physiological evidence for an interaction between the parallel task and sub-processes of deception (e.g. inhibition) was found. Subjects' performance in the Go/No-go parallel task did not contribute to the detection of concealed information. Generalizability needs further investigations of different variations of the parallel task.

The role of mundane mobility and contact in dialect death and dialect birth

Urry begins his 2007 book, Mobilities, by throwing some quite stunning statistics at his readers: in 2010, there were one billion legal international arrivals at ports and airports; in 1800 people in the US travelled on average 50 metres per day, today it is 50 kilometres per day; 8.7% of world employment is in tourism; and, at any one time, there are 360,000 passengers in flight above the United States (2007: 3-4). But very many of these mobilities for the individuals concerned are or have become rather unexceptional – a flight to a holiday in Majorca or Florida, a journey on a crowded commuter train into Madrid or Tokyo, a cross-Channel ferry to Calais in France to pick up some cheap wine and a camembert. Whilst much of the theoretically influential dialectological literature on mobility reports on long-distance, often permanent, often dangerous migrations, I turn our attention here to the dialectological consequences of this unexceptional everyday movement. I will argue here that, just as more dramatic and long-distance mobilities can trigger linguistic change, so too can the much more mundane movements we engage in in everyday life. I demonstrate that the linguistic consequences of that contact are similar if not the same – perhaps less dramatic, perhaps involving the convergence of an initially less divergent array of variants – but typologically of the same ilk. And I demonstrate that because these mobilities have been long-term, intensive and ongoing, their consequences on the dialect landscape have been highly significant. Important to remember, however, is that these mobilities are socially stratified and unevenly distributed. As Wolff put it: “the suggestion of free and equal mobility is … a deception, since we don’t all have the same access to the road” (1993: 253).

Who is honest and why: Baseline activation in anterior insula predicts inter-individual differences in deceptive behavior

Humans engage in deceptive behavior that negatively affects others. The propensity to deceive is,however, characterized by vast inter-individual heterogeneity that is poorly understood. Attempts to investigate the origins of this heterogeneity have so far mainly relied on subjective measures and have shown little predictive power. Here, we used resting electroencephalography to measure objective and stable individual differences in neural baseline activation in combination with an ecologically valid deception paradigm. Results showed that task-independent baseline activation in the anterior insula, a brain area implicated in mapping internal bodily states and in representing emotional arousal and consciousfeelings, predicts individuals’ propensity for deceptive behavior. The higher the neural baseline activation in this area is, the lower individuals’ propensity to deceive. Moreover, results provide evidence that high baseline activation in the anterior insula is associated with negative affect and dispositional tendencies to avoid aversive emotional situations. These results provide converging neural and psychological evidence that individuals might avoid a deceptive act due to a highly active negative emotional system which would make a deceptive act too stressful and bothersome.

Analytical thinking under distrust - better not to know that one distrusts

It is widely known that people utter an untruth from time to time. Our ability to detect and recognize deception and lies and, in the next step, to respond appropriately is not very far-reaching. We were interested in finding out if distrust triggers non-routine, analytical thought processes and therefore improves the detection of lies without dismissing the truth. We conducted two experiments to investigate the influence of an unconscious form of distrust on our thought processes. In the first experiment, participants had to determine whether a report is truthful or false. The aim of this second experiment was to investigate if this enhanced ability to detect a falsified report correctly is based on analytical thinking taking place. To examine our assumptions, we applied the paradigm of belief bias. The results of the second experiments strongly point out the fact that an unconscious form of distrust triggers and fosters analytical thinking.

Unistructed BIAT faking when ego depleted or in normal state: Differential effect on brain and behavior

Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants (15 females, 24.23 ± 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first completed a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative doping attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT performance was assessed using high-density EEG. Results: Compared to the baseline BIAT, event-related potentials showed a first interaction at the parietal P1, while significant post hoc differences were found only at the later occurring late positive potential. Here, significantly decreased amplitudes were recorded for ‘normal’ faking, but not in the depletion condition. In source space, enhanced activity was found for ‘normal’ faking in the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Behaviorally, participants were successful in faking the BIAT successfully in both conditions. Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are markedly different. Electronic supplementary material: The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12868-016-0249-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.