Do Words Matter? The Impact of Communication on the PIIGS' CDS and Bond Yield Spreads during Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis

The paper aims to shed light on the role of communication in the European debt crisis. It examines the effects of public statements by ECB Governing Council members, EU officials and national representatives on the PIIGS' CDS and bond yield spreads. The focus lies on dovish statements that signal strong determination in the rescue of indebted countries, and hawkish statements that indicate limited commitment to support the PIIGS and protect its creditors. The analysis of daily data for the period between January 1, 2009 and August 12, 2011 in an EGARCH framework suggests that communication by representatives of Germany, France, and the EU as well as ECB Governing Council members had an immediate impact on both types of securities. No effects.

Credibility for sale

We develop a model where a sovereign’s incentive to repay its debt depends on the identity of its creditors. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives and thus credibility, for instance, because default would jeopardize the benefits from membership in a club (such as EU or EMU). But higher exposure also carries costs, because of reduced flexibility ex post and because official lenders may collude to extract rents. We characterize the equilibrium composition of debt across creditor groups as well as equilibrium debt prices. Our model can account for an important— and still unexplained—feature of sovereign debt crises: Official lending to sovereigns takes place only in times of debt distress and carries a favorable rate. It also offers a novel perspective on the interaction between deficits, debt overhang and the availability of official funds in determining default risk.