8 resultados para cost-aware process design
em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça
Resumo:
OBJECTIVE: To determine the impact of a community based Helicobacter pylori screening and eradication programme on the incidence of dyspepsia, resource use, and quality of life, including a cost consequences analysis. DESIGN: H pylori screening programme followed by randomised placebo controlled trial of eradication. SETTING: Seven general practices in southwest England. PARTICIPANTS: 10,537 unselected people aged 20-59 years were screened for H pylori infection (13C urea breath test); 1558 of the 1636 participants who tested positive were randomised to H pylori eradication treatment or placebo, and 1539 (99%) were followed up for two years. INTERVENTION: Ranitidine bismuth citrate 400 mg and clarithromycin 500 mg twice daily for two weeks or placebo. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Primary care consultation rates for dyspepsia (defined as epigastric pain) two years after randomisation, with secondary outcomes of dyspepsia symptoms, resource use, NHS costs, and quality of life. RESULTS: In the eradication group, 35% fewer participants consulted for dyspepsia over two years compared with the placebo group (55/787 v 78/771; odds ratio 0.65, 95% confidence interval 0.46 to 0.94; P = 0.021; number needed to treat 30) and 29% fewer participants had regular symptoms (odds ratio 0.71, 0.56 to 0.90; P = 0.05). NHS costs were 84.70 pounds sterling (74.90 pounds sterling to 93.91 pounds sterling) greater per participant in the eradication group over two years, of which 83.40 pounds sterling (146 dollars; 121 euro) was the cost of eradication treatment. No difference in quality of life existed between the two groups. CONCLUSIONS: Community screening and eradication of H pylori is feasible in the general population and led to significant reductions in the number of people who consulted for dyspepsia and had symptoms two years after treatment. These benefits have to be balanced against the costs of eradication treatment, so a targeted eradication strategy in dyspeptic patients may be preferable.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Complete investigation of thrombophilic or hemorrhagic clinical presentations is a time-, apparatus-, and cost-intensive process. Sensitive screening tests for characterizing the overall function of the hemostatic system, or defined parts of it, would be very useful. For this purpose, we are developing an electrochemical biosensor system that allows measurement of thrombin generation in whole blood as well as in plasma. METHODS: The measuring system consists of a single-use electrochemical sensor in the shape of a strip and a measuring unit connected to a personal computer, recording the electrical signal. Blood is added to a specific reagent mixture immobilized in dry form on the strip, including a coagulation activator (e.g., tissue factor or silica) and an electrogenic substrate specific to thrombin. RESULTS: Increasing thrombin concentrations gave standard curves with progressively increasing maximal current and decreasing time to reach the peak. Because the measurement was unaffected by color or turbidity, any type of blood sample could be analyzed: platelet-poor plasma, platelet-rich plasma, and whole blood. The test strips with the predried reagents were stable when stored for several months before testing. Analysis of the combined results obtained with different activators allowed discrimination between defects of the extrinsic, intrinsic, and common coagulation pathways. Activated protein C (APC) predried on the strips allowed identification of APC-resistance in plasma and whole blood samples. CONCLUSIONS: The biosensor system provides a new method for assessing thrombin generation in plasma or whole blood samples as small as 10 microL. The assay is easy to use, thus allowing it to be performed in a point-of-care setting.
Resumo:
This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVES The aim of this prospective cohort trial was to perform a cost/time analysis for implant-supported single-unit reconstructions in the digital workflow compared to the conventional pathway. MATERIALS AND METHODS A total of 20 patients were included for rehabilitation with 2 × 20 implant crowns in a crossover study design and treated consecutively each with customized titanium abutments plus CAD/CAM-zirconia-suprastructures (test: digital) and with standardized titanium abutments plus PFM-crowns (control conventional). Starting with prosthetic treatment, analysis was estimated for clinical and laboratory work steps including measure of costs in Swiss Francs (CHF), productivity rates and cost minimization for first-line therapy. Statistical calculations were performed with Wilcoxon signed-rank test. RESULTS Both protocols worked successfully for all test and control reconstructions. Direct treatment costs were significantly lower for the digital workflow 1815.35 CHF compared to the conventional pathway 2119.65 CHF [P = 0.0004]. For subprocess evaluation, total laboratory costs were calculated as 941.95 CHF for the test group and 1245.65 CHF for the control group, respectively [P = 0.003]. The clinical dental productivity rate amounted to 29.64 CHF/min (digital) and 24.37 CHF/min (conventional) [P = 0.002]. Overall, cost minimization analysis exhibited an 18% cost reduction within the digital process. CONCLUSION The digital workflow was more efficient than the established conventional pathway for implant-supported crowns in this investigation.