Sportvereine als Interessenorganisationen?! – Ursachen und Auswirkungen von Ziel-Interessen-Divergenzen in freiwilligen Sportorganisationen

Für Sportvereine als Interessenorganisationen scheint die Rückbindung der Vereinsziele an die Mitgliederinteressen von zentraler Bedeutung zu sein. In der Vereinsrealität dürfte aber diese Rückbindung nur teilweise gewährleistet sein und folglich Ziel-Interessen-Divergenzen eher die Norm als die Ausnahme darstellen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage, welche Ursachen für Ziel-Interessen-Divergenzen verantwortlich zu machen sind und welche Auswirkungen sich daraus für die Vereine ergeben. Dieser Frage geht der vorliegende Beitrag nach, indem auf der Grundlage des Akteurtheoretischen Mehr-Ebenen-Modells zur Analyse der Entwicklung von Sportvereinen die struktur- und handlungsbedingten Ursachen und Auswirkungen von Divergenzen auf der Vereins- und Mitgliederebene beleuchtet werden. Mit Blick auf die Ursachen wurde der Einfluss der korporativen Vereinsstrukturen und der individuellen Handlungsorientierungen der Mitglieder auf Divergenzen untersucht. Die Befunde hierzu zeigen, dass Divergenzen einerseits durch einem zunehmenden Differenzierungs- und Hierarchisierungsgrad (z.B. Vereinsgröße, Umweltvernetzung, Oligarchisierung) begünstigt werden und andererseits vor allem bei einer primären Verfolgung von Eigeninteressen der Mitglieder auftreten. Hinsichtlich der Auswirkungen wurden die individuellen Mitgliederreaktionen und die korporativen Vereinsreaktionen auf Divergenzen analysiert. Diesbezüglich zeigen die Befunde, dass sowohl die Mitglieder als auch die Vereinsführung überwiegend konstruktiv auf Divergenzen reagieren (z.B. durch Problemansprache, Vertrauen, Kompromissfindung), so dass es vielen Vereinen offenbar relativ gut gelingt, Ziel-Interessen-Divergenzen bis zu einem gewissen Grad sowohl aushalten als auch aufarbeiten zu können.

Intergenerational Transfer of Family Firm Control: Discount Expectations of Potential Successors

Building on institutional theory and family sociology literature we explore the logics that underlie the formation of transaction price expectations related to the intergenerational transfer of corporate ownership in private family firms. By probing a sample of 3'487 students with family business background from 20 countries we show that next generation family members expect to receive a 56.58% discount in comparison to some nonfamily buyer (i.e. the family discount) when taking over the parent's firm. We also show that the logic underlying the formation of family discount expectations is characterized by parental altruism, filial reciprocity, filial decency and parental inducement. These norms embrace both the family and market logics and accommodate the duties and demands of children and parents in determining a fair transfer price. These findings are important for institutional theory as well as for family business and entrepreneurial exit literatures.

The Impact of Relationship Conflict on subjective Family Firm Valuation

The present paper empirically investigates the impact of family relationship conflict on subjective firm valuation by family firm owner managers. Drawing on the emerging socioemotional wealth perspective of corporate ownership, we find a U-shaped relationship between relationship conflict inside the family firm and subjective family firm valuation. This finding suggests that negatively valenced emotions induced by the conflict, at low levels of conflict, lead to emotion congruent withdrawal behavior and hence lower valuation. With conflicts gaining in fervor and severity, owner-managers start endowing and pricing sunk costs related to the conflict. This finding suggests that emotions do indeed have spill-over effects on monetary value perceptions and that negatively valenced emotions induced by relationship conflict are not linearly appraised. Rather, to understand the impact of negative emotions on corporate ownership appraisal and attachment it is required to reconcile the emotion congruency with the prospect theory perspective.

Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: Tracking Faint Traces

We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to the residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.

Acute pain therapy in German hospitals as competitive factor : Do competition, ownership and case severity influence the practice of acute pain therapy?

BACKGROUND Due to the implementation of the diagnosis-related groups (DRG) system, the competitive pressure on German hospitals increased. In this context it has been shown that acute pain management offers economic benefits for hospitals. The aim of this study was to analyze the impact of the competitive situation, the ownership and the economic resources required on structures and processes for acute pain management. MATERIAL AND METHODS A standardized questionnaire on structures and processes of acute pain management was mailed to the 885 directors of German departments of anesthesiology listed as members of the German Society of Anesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine (DGAI, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Anästhesiologie und Intensivmedizin). RESULTS For most hospitals a strong regional competition existed; however, this parameter affected neither the implementation of structures nor the recommended treatment processes for pain therapy. In contrast, a clear preference for hospitals in private ownership to use the benchmarking tool QUIPS (quality improvement in postoperative pain therapy) was found. These hospitals also presented information on coping with the management of pain in the corporate clinic mission statement more often and published information about the quality of acute pain management in the quality reports more frequently. No differences were found between hospitals with different forms of ownership in the implementation of acute pain services, quality circles, expert standard pain management and the implementation of recommended processes. Hospitals with a higher case mix index (CMI) had a certified acute pain management more often. The corporate mission statement of these hospitals also contained information on how to cope with pain, presentation of the quality of pain management in the quality report, implementation of quality circles and the implementation of the expert standard pain management more frequently. There were no differences in the frequency of using the benchmarking tool QUIPS or the implementation of recommended treatment processes with respect to the CMI. CONCLUSION In this survey no effect of the competitive situation of hospitals on acute pain management could be demonstrated. Private ownership and a higher CMI were more often associated with structures of acute pain management which were publicly accessible in terms of hospital marketing.