Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the experience of a comprehensive sample

The sample used includes tender offers, mergers, acquisitions of privately held corporations, and comprehensive acquisitions of other firms' assets. According to the results, the majority of bid announcements prompt significant stock price increases, especially when controlling for partial anticipation problems and relative acquisition size. Furthermore, there is little evidence that firms that engage in "bad" acquisitions are more likely to be taken over.