Religion as Culture? How European and American High Courts Endorse Majority Religion

This paper examines a trend in European and American High Courts to endorse majority religion by transforming it into “culture”, and thus by secularizing it. To dissociate religion and state is the hallmark of the liberal state. However, no state has ever managed a perfect separation, not even the American. Under conditions of mounting religious pluralism and ongoing secularization, there is pressure on the state to live up to its “neutrality”. A main strategy to square the circle of neutrality and incomplete dissociation from religion is to declare it “culture”, which gives the state the license to associate or even identify with it (as guardian of nationhood). The paper compares recent American and European High Court rules on religious symbols (especially crucifixes) that exhibits this strategy, addressing similarities and differences as well as the limits and pitfalls of “culturalizing” religion.

Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: Nomination and Appointment of Judicial Candidates in the WTO Appellate Body

Scholars have increasingly theorized, and debated, the decision by states to create and delegate authority to international courts, as well as the subsequent autonomy and behavior of those courts, with principal–agent and trusteeship models disagreeing on the nature and extent of states’ influence on international judges. This article formulates and tests a set of principal–agent hypotheses about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, member states are able use their powers of judicial nomination and appointment to influence the endogenous preferences of international judges. The empirical analysis surveys the record of all judicial appointments to the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization over a 15-year period. We present a view of an AB appointment process that, far from representing a pure search for expertise, is deeply politicized and offers member-state principals opportunities to influence AB members ex ante and possibly ex post. We further demonstrate that the AB nomination process has become progressively more politicized over time as member states, responding to earlier and controversial AB decisions, became far more concerned about judicial activism and more interested in the substantive opinions of AB candidates, systematically championing candidates whose views on key issues most closely approached their own, and opposing candidates perceived to be activist or biased against their substantive preferences. Although specific to the WTO, our theory and findings have implications for the judicial politics of a large variety of global and regional international courts and tribunals.