3 resultados para benefits design
em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Ischemic stroke is the leading cause of mortality worldwide and a major contributor to neurological disability and dementia. Terutroban is a specific TP receptor antagonist with antithrombotic, antivasoconstrictive, and antiatherosclerotic properties, which may be of interest for the secondary prevention of ischemic stroke. This article describes the rationale and design of the Prevention of cerebrovascular and cardiovascular Events of ischemic origin with teRutroban in patients with a history oF ischemic strOke or tRansient ischeMic Attack (PERFORM) Study, which aims to demonstrate the superiority of the efficacy of terutroban versus aspirin in secondary prevention of cerebrovascular and cardiovascular events. METHODS AND RESULTS: The PERFORM Study is a multicenter, randomized, double-blind, parallel-group study being carried out in 802 centers in 46 countries. The study population includes patients aged > or =55 years, having suffered an ischemic stroke (< or =3 months) or a transient ischemic attack (< or =8 days). Participants are randomly allocated to terutroban (30 mg/day) or aspirin (100 mg/day). The primary efficacy endpoint is a composite of ischemic stroke (fatal or nonfatal), myocardial infarction (fatal or nonfatal), or other vascular death (excluding hemorrhagic death of any origin). Safety is being evaluated by assessing hemorrhagic events. Follow-up is expected to last for 2-4 years. Assuming a relative risk reduction of 13%, the expected number of primary events is 2,340. To obtain statistical power of 90%, this requires inclusion of at least 18,000 patients in this event-driven trial. The first patient was randomized in February 2006. CONCLUSIONS: The PERFORM Study will explore the benefits and safety of terutroban in secondary cardiovascular prevention after a cerebral ischemic event.
Resumo:
This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.
Resumo:
Abstract Purpose Aortic stenosis (AS) is the most common valvular abnormality in the elderly population. For inoperable patients or those at high-risk for surgery, transcatheter aortic valve implantation (TAVI) has become an alternative therapeutic option. The aim of the “Comprehensive geriatric assessment for transcatheter aortic valve implantation” (CGA-TAVI) registry is to evaluate the effectiveness of TAVI from the perspective of the geriatrician and to identify patient characteristics and indicators related to complications and clinical benefits for patients with symptomatic severe calcified degenerative AS undergoing TAVI. Materials and methods The CGA-TAVI registry is an international, multi-center, prospective, observational registry across Europe with consecutive patient enrolment. The registry will enrol up to 200 patients with AS undergoing TAVI, starting August 2013. CGA-TAVI has two co-primary objectives: (1) Establish predictive value of Comprehensive geriatric assessment (CGA) for mortality and/or hospitalization in TAVI patients. (2) Demonstrate CGA changes within 3 months after TAVI. Secondary objectives are: (1) Establish predictive value of CGA in TAVI patients for all-cause hospitalization, TAVI-related hospitalization, and nursing home admission. (2) Develop a comprehensive score for the assessment of TAVI patient prognosis. Conclusions The data obtained from the CGA-TAVI registry will supplement previous results to document the potential value of the effectiveness of TAVI from the perspective of geriatricians and will allow the assessment of the predictive value of CGA for mortality and/or hospitalization in elderly TAVI patients. Keywords Aortic stenosis; Transcatheter aortic valve implantation (TAVI); Comprehensive geriatric assessment (CGA); Registry; Predictor