Realizing public announcements by justifications

Modal public announcement logics study how beliefs change after public announcements. However, these logics cannot express the reason for a new belief. Justification logics fill this gap since they can formally represent evidence and justifications for an agent's belief. We present OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) , two alternative justification counterparts of Gerbrandy–Groeneveld's public announcement logic PAL(K) . We show that PAL(K) is the forgetful projection of both OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) . We also establish that JPAL(K) partially realizes PAL(K) . The question whether a similar result holds for OPAL(K) is still open.

Justified Belief Change

Justification Logic is a framework for reasoning about evidence and justification. Public Announcement Logic is a framework for reasoning about belief changes caused by public announcements. This paper develops JPAL, a dynamic justification logic of public announcements that corresponds to the modal theory of public announcements due to Gerbrandy and Groeneveld. JPAL allows us to reason about evidence brought about by and changed by Gerbrandy--Groeneveld-style public announcements.

Corporate dividencs and seasoned equity issues: an empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.

Corporate acquisitions by listed firms: the experience of a comprehensive sample

The sample used includes tender offers, mergers, acquisitions of privately held corporations, and comprehensive acquisitions of other firms' assets. According to the results, the majority of bid announcements prompt significant stock price increases, especially when controlling for partial anticipation problems and relative acquisition size. Furthermore, there is little evidence that firms that engage in "bad" acquisitions are more likely to be taken over.

Draft Genome Sequence of the Virulent Avibacterium paragallinarum Serotype A Strain JF4211 and Identification of Two Toxins

Avibacterium paragallinarum is an important pathogen of chicken livestock causing infectious coryza. Here, we report the draft genome sequence of the virulent A. paragallinarum serotype A strain JF4211 (2.8 Mbp and G+C content of 41%) and the two toxin operons discovered from the annotation of the genome.

Draft Genome Sequence of the Virulent Clostridium chauvoei Reference Strain JF4335

Clostridium chauvoei is the etiological agent of blackleg, a disease of cattle and sheep with high mortality rates, causing severe economic losses in livestock production. Here, we report the draft genome sequence of the virulent C. chauvoei strain JF4335 (2.8 Mbp and 28% G+C content) and the annotation of the genome.

Genome Sequence of Mycoplasma feriruminatoris sp. nov., a Fast-Growing Mycoplasma Species

Members of the “Mycoplasma mycoides cluster” represent important livestock pathogens worldwide. We report the genome sequence of Mycoplasma feriruminatoris sp. nov., the closest relative to the “Mycoplasma mycoides cluster” and the fastest-growing Mycoplasma species described to date.

Complete genome sequences of both biotypes of a virus pair of bovine viral diarrhea virus subgenotype 1k

We determined the complete genome sequences of both biotypes of a virus pair of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) subgenotype 1k. The viruses were isolated from a persistently infected calf suffering from mucosal disease. Compared to the noncytopathic biotype, the cytopathic biotype contains an insertion of 84 nucleotides and 22 nucleotide changes.

Genome Sequences of Two Klebsiella pneumoniae Isolates from Different Geographical Regions, Argentina (Strain JHCK1) and the United States (Strain VA360)

We report the sequences of two Klebsiella pneumoniae clinical isolates, strains JHCK1 and VA360, from a newborn with meningitis in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and from a tertiary care medical center in Cleveland, OH, respectively. Both isolates contain one chromosome and at least five plasmids; isolate VA360 contains the Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) gene

Complete Genome Sequences of Virulent Mycoplasma capricolum subsp. capripneumoniae Strains F38 and ILRI181

Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP) caused by Mycoplasma capricolum subsp. capripneumoniae is a severe epidemic affecting mainly domestic Caprinae species but also affects wild Caprinae species. M. capricolum subsp. capripneumoniae belongs to the "Mycoplasma mycoides cluster." The disease features prominently in East Africa, in particular Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. CCPP also endangers wildlife and thus affects not only basic nutritional resources of large populations but also expensively built-up game resorts in affected countries. Here, we report the complete sequences of two M. capricolum subsp. capripneumoniae strains: the type strain F38 and strain ILRI181 isolated druing a recent outbreak in Kenya. Both genomes have a G+C content of 24% with sizes of 1,016,760 bp and 1,017,183 bp for strains F38 and ILRI181, respectively.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Complete Genome Sequence of Bovine Pestivirus Strain PG-2, a Second Member of the Tentative Pestivirus Species Giraffe

We report the complete genome sequence of bovine pestivirus strain PG-2. The sequence data from this virus showed that PG-2 is closely related to the giraffe pestivirus strain H138. PG-2 and H138 belong to one pestivirus species that should be considered an approved member of the genus Pestivirus.