Temporomandibular disorders/myoarthropathy of the masticatory system. Costs of dental treatment and reimbursement by Swiss federal insurance agencies according to the Health Care Benefits Ordinance (KLV)

The goal of the study was to calculate the direct costs of therapy for patients with MAP. This retrospective study included 242 MAP patients treated at the Department of Prosthodontics of the University of Bern between 2003 and 2006. The following parameters were collected from the clinical charts: chief complaint, diagnosis, treatment modalities, total costs, costs of the dental technician, number of appointments, average cost per appointment, length of treatment, and services reimbursed by health insurance agencies. The average age of the patients was 40.4 ± 17.3 years (76.4% women, 23.6% men). The chief complaint was pain in 91.3% of the cases, TMJ noises (61.2%) or limitation of mandibular mobility (53.3%). Tendomyopathy (22.3%), disc displacement (22.4%), or a combination of the two (37.6%) were more often diagnosed than arthropathy alone (7.4%). Furthermore, 10.3% of the MAP patients had another primary diagnosis (tumor, trauma, etc.). Patients were treated with counseling and exercises (36.0%), physiotherapy (23.6%), or occlusal splints (32.6%). The cost of treatment reached 644 Swiss francs for four appointments spread over an average of 21 weeks. In the great majority of cases, patients can be treated with inexpensive modalities. 99.9% of the MAP cases submitted to the insurance agencies were reimbursed by them, in accordance with Article 17d1-3 of the Swiss Health Care Benefits Ordinance (KLV) and Article 25 of the Federal Health Insurance Act (KVG). The costs of treatment performed by dentists remain modest. The more time-consuming services, such as providing information, counseling and instructions, are poorly remunerated. This aspect should be re-evaluated in a future revision of the tariff schedule.

A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies

This article uses a policy network perspective to assess the independence of regulatory agencies (RAs) in liberalized public utility sectors. We focus on the de facto independence of RAs from elected politicians, regulatees and other co-regulators. We go further than previous studies, which only undertook a general analysis of the de jure independence of RAs from political authorities. Specifically, we apply a social network analysis (SNA), which concentrates on the attributes and relational profiles of all actors involved in new regulatory arrangements. The concept of de facto independence is applied to the Swiss telecommunications sector in order to provide initial empirical insights. Results clearly show that SNA indicators are an appropriate tool to identify the de facto independence of RAs and can improve knowledge about the issues arising from the emergence of the ‘regulatory State’.

Having your cake and eating it too: Can regulatory agencies be both independent and accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Regulation of the Telecommunications in Switzerland: A Network Approach to Assess the Regulatory Agencies' Independence

The liberalization process of the Swiss telecommunications sector follows a logic of ‘autonomous adaptation’ to the regulations of the European Union (EU). Switzerland, which is not a Member State of the EU, voluntarily adapts to the European policy without being for- mally required to do so (Sciarini et al., 2004). This process went hand in hand with the partial privatization of the legal statute and assets of the former monopolist and with the re-regulation of the liberalized telecommunications sector.

Regulation and the Management of Expectations - Rating Agencies Revisited

In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars have begun to revise their conceptions of how market participants interact. While the traditional “rationalist optic” posits market participants who are able to process decisionrelevant information and thereby transform uncertainty into quantifiable risks, the increasingly popular “sociological optic” stresses the role of uncertainty in expectation formation and social conventions for creating confidence in markets. Applications of the sociological optic to concrete regulatory problems are still limited. By subjecting both optics to the same regulatory problem—the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their ratings in capital markets—this paper provides insights into whether the sociological optic offers advice to tackle concrete regulatory problems and discusses the potential of the sociological optic in complementing the rationalist optic. The empirical application suggests that the sociological optic is not only able to improve our understanding of the role of CRAs and their ratings, but also to provide solutions complementary to those posited by the rationalist optic.