A double role of sperm in scorpions: the mating plug of Euscorpius italicus (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae) consists of sperm

Mating plugs occluding the female gonopore after mating are a widespread phenomenon. In scorpions, two main types of mating plugs are found: sclerotized mating plugs being parts of the spermatophore that break off during mating, and gel-like mating plugs being gelatinous fluids that harden in the female genital tract. In this study, the gel-like mating plug of Euscorpius italicus was investigated with respect to its composition, fine structure, and changes over time. Sperm forms the major component of the mating plug, a phenomenon previously unknown in arachnids. Three parts of the mating plug can be distinguished. The part facing the outside of the female (outer part) contains sperm packages containing inactive spermatozoa. In this state, sperm is transferred. In the median part, the sperm packages get uncoiled to single spermatozoa. In the inner part, free sperm is embedded in a large amount of secretions. Fresh mating plugs are soft gelatinous, later they harden from outside toward inside. This process is completed after 3-5 days. Sperm from artificially triggered spermatophores could be activated by immersion in insect Ringer's solution indicating that the fluid condition in the females' genital tract or females' secretions causes sperm activation. Because of the male origin of the mating plug, it has likely evolved under sperm competition or sexual conflict. As females refused to remate irrespective of the presence or absence of a mating plug, females may have changed their mating behavior in the course of evolution from polyandry to monandry.

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear

The end of the corporate life cycle

This paper asks how takeover and failure hazards change as listed firms get older. The hypothesis is that they increase because firms gradually run out of growth opportunities. We find the opposite. Both takeover and failure hazard drop significantly with age. The decline in takeover hazard can be explained with Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli’s (2013) “buggy whip makers” hypothesis: Because old firms are comparatively well-managed and are affected by limited agency problems, on average, they offer little value added potential to acquirers. Failure hazard drops because to learning. The results are robust to various alternative interpretations and cannot be explained by unobserved heterogeneity. While hazards decline with age, they do not go to zero. This explains why, eventually, all listed firms disappear