Tropical cyclone-related socio-economic losses in the western North Pacific region

The western North Pacific (WNP) is the area of the world most frequently affected by tropical cyclones (TCs). However, little is known about the socio-economic impacts of TCs in this region, probably because of the limited relevant loss data. Here, loss data from Munich RE's NatCatSERVICE database is used, a high-quality and widely consulted database of natural disasters. In the country-level loss normalisation technique we apply, the original loss data are normalised to present-day exposure levels by using the respective country's nominal gross domestic product at purchasing power parity as a proxy for wealth. The main focus of our study is on the question of whether the decadal-scale TC variability observed in the Northwest Pacific region in recent decades can be shown to manifest itself economically in an associated variability in losses. It is shown that since 1980 the frequency of TC-related loss events in the WNP exhibited, apart from seasonal and interannual variations, interdecadal variability with a period of about 22 yr – driven primarily by corresponding variations of Northwest Pacific TCs. Compared to the long-term mean, the number of loss events was found to be higher (lower) by 14% (9%) in the positive (negative) phase of the decadal-scale WNP TC frequency variability. This was identified for the period 1980–2008 by applying a wavelet analysis technique. It was also possible to demonstrate the same low-frequency variability in normalised direct economic losses from TCs in the WNP region. The identification of possible physical mechanisms responsible for the observed decadal-scale Northwest Pacific TC variability will be the subject of future research, even if suggestions have already been made in earlier studies.

Long-term perspective on wildfires in the western USA

Understanding the causes and consequences of wildfires in forests of the western United States requires integrated information about fire, climate changes, and human activity on multiple temporal scales. We use sedimentary charcoal accumulation rates to construct long-term variations in fire during the past 3,000 y in the American West and compare this record to independent fire-history data from historical records and fire scars. There has been a slight decline in burning over the past 3,000 y, with the lowest levels attained during the 20th century and during the Little Ice Age (LIA, ca. 1400-1700 CE Common Era]). Prominent peaks in forest fires occurred during the Medieval Climate Anomaly (ca. 950-1250 CE) and during the 1800s. Analysis of climate reconstructions beginning from 500 CE and population data show that temperature and drought predict changes in biomass burning up to the late 1800s CE. Since the late 1800s, human activities and the ecological effects of recent high fire activity caused a large, abrupt decline in burning similar to the LIA fire decline. Consequently, there is now a forest ``fire deficit'' in the western United States attributable to the combined effects of human activities, ecological, and climate changes. Large fires in the late 20th and 21st century fires have begun to address the fire deficit, but it is continuing to grow.

The Power of Tolerance. A Debate

We invoke the ideal of tolerance in response to conflict, but what does it mean to answer conflict with a call for tolerance? Is tolerance a way of resolving conflicts or a means of sustaining them? Does it transform conflicts into productive tensions, or does it perpetuate underlying power relations? To what extent does tolerance hide its involvement with power and act as a form of depoliticization? Wendy Brown and Rainer Forst debate the uses and misuses of tolerance, an exchange that highlights the fundamental differences in their critical practice despite a number of political similarities. Both scholars address the normative premises, limits, and political implications of various conceptions of tolerance. Brown offers a genealogical critique of contemporary discourses on tolerance in Western liberal societies, focusing on their inherent ties to colonialism and imperialism, and Forst reconstructs an intellectual history of tolerance that attempts to redeem its political virtue in democratic societies. Brown and Forst work from different perspectives and traditions, yet they each remain wary of the subjection and abnegation embodied in toleration discourses, among other issues. The result is a dialogue rich in critical and conceptual reflections on power, justice, discourse, rationality, and identity.

Renal microvascular assembly and repair: power and promise of molecular definition.

Developmental assembly of the renal microcirculation is a precise and coordinated process now accessible to experimental scrutiny. Although definition of the cellular and molecular determinants is incomplete, recent findings have reframed concepts and questions about the origins of vascular cells in the glomerulus and the molecules that direct cell recruitment, specialization and morphogenesis. New findings illustrate principles that may be applied to defining critical steps in microvascular repair following glomerular injury. Developmental assembly of endothelial, mesangial and epithelial cells into glomerular capillaries requires that a coordinated, temporally defined series of steps occur in an anatomically ordered sequence. Recent evidence shows that both vasculogenic and angiogenic processes participate. Local signals direct cell migration, proliferation, differentiation, cell-cell recognition, formation of intercellular connections, and morphogenesis. Growth factor receptor tyrosine kinases on vascular cells are important mediators of many of these events. Cultured cell systems have suggested that basic fibroblast growth factor (bFGF), hepatocyte growth factor (HGF), and vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) promote endothelial cell proliferation, migration or morphogenesis, while genetic deletion experiments have defined an important role for PDGF beta receptors and platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF) B in glomerular development. Receptor tyrosine kinases that convey non-proliferative signals also contribute in kidney and other sites. The EphB1 receptor, one of a diverse class of Eph receptors implicated in neural cell targeting, directs renal endothelial migration, cell-cell recognition and assembly, and is expressed with its ligand in developing glomeruli. Endothelial TIE2 receptors bind angiopoietins (1 and 2), the products of adjacent supportive cells, to signals direct capillary maturation in a sequence that defines cooperative roles for cells of different lineages. Ultimately, definition of the cellular steps and molecular sequence that direct microvascular cell assembly promises to identify therapeutic targets for repair and adaptive remodeling of injured glomeruli.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

A daily rainfall erosivity model for Western Amazonia

Rainfall erosivities as defined by the R factor from the universal soil loss equation were determined for all events during a two-year period at the station La Cuenca in western Amazonia. Three methods based on a power relationship between rainfall amount and erosivity were then applied to estimate event and daily rainfall erosivities from the respective rainfall amounts. A test of the resulting regression equations against an independent data set proved all three methods equally adequate in predicting rainfall erosivity from daily rainfall amount. We recommend the Richardson model for testing in the Amazon Basin, and its use with the coefficient from La Cuenca in western Amazonia.