Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts

Prompted reports of recall of spontaneous, conscious experiences were collected in a no-input, no-task, no-response paradigm (30 random prompts to each of 13 healthy volunteers). The mentation reports were classified into visual imagery and abstract thought. Spontaneous 19-channel brain electric activity (EEG) was continuously recorded, viewed as series of momentary spatial distributions (maps) of the brain electric field and segmented into microstates, i.e. into time segments characterized by quasi-stable landscapes of potential distribution maps which showed varying durations in the sub-second range. Microstate segmentation used a data-driven strategy. Different microstates, i.e. different brain electric landscapes must have been generated by activity of different neural assemblies and therefore are hypothesized to constitute different functions. The two types of reported experiences were associated with significantly different microstates (mean duration 121 ms) immediately preceding the prompts; these microstates showed, across subjects, for abstract thought (compared to visual imagery) a shift of the electric gravity center to the left and a clockwise rotation of the field axis. Contrariwise, the microstates 2 s before the prompt did not differ between the two types of experiences. The results support the hypothesis that different microstates of the brain as recognized in its electric field implement different conscious, reportable mind states, i.e. different classes (types) of thoughts (mentations); thus, the microstates might be candidates for the `atoms of thought'.

Core networks for visual-concrete and abstract thought content: a brain electric microstate analysis

Commonality of activation of spontaneously forming and stimulus-induced mental representations is an often made but rarely tested assumption in neuroscience. In a conjunction analysis of two earlier studies, brain electric activity during visual-concrete and abstract thoughts was studied. The conditions were: in study 1, spontaneous stimulus-independent thinking (post-hoc, visual imagery or abstract thought were identified); in study 2, reading of single nouns ranking high or low on a visual imagery scale. In both studies, subjects' tasks were similar: when prompted, they had to recall the last thought (study 1) or the last word (study 2). In both studies, subjects had no instruction to classify or to visually imagine their thoughts, and accordingly were not aware of the studies' aim. Brain electric data were analyzed into functional topographic brain images (using LORETA) of the last microstate before the prompt (study 1) and of the word-type discriminating event-related microstate after word onset (study 2). Conjunction analysis across the two studies yielded commonality of activation of core networks for abstract thought content in left anterior superior regions, and for visual-concrete thought content in right temporal-posterior inferior regions. The results suggest that two different core networks are automatedly activated when abstract or visual-concrete information, respectively, enters working memory, without a subject task or instruction about the two classes of information, and regardless of internal or external origin, and of input modality. These core machineries of working memory thus are invariant to source or modality of input when treating the two types of information.

The functional significance of EEG microstates-Associations with modalities of thinking

The momentary, global functional state of the brain is reflected by its electric field configuration. Cluster analytical approaches consistently extracted four head-surface brain electric field configurations that optimally explain the variance of their changes across time in spontaneous EEG recordings. These four configurations are referred to as EEG microstate classes A, B, C, and D and have been associated with verbal/phonological, visual, attention reorientation, and subjective interoceptive-autonomic processing, respectively. The present study tested these associations via an intra-individual and inter-individual analysis approach. The intra-individual approach tested the effect of task-induced increased modality-specific processing on EEG microstate parameters. The inter-individual approach tested the effect of personal modality-specific parameters on EEG microstate parameters. We obtained multichannel EEG from 61 healthy, right-handed, male students during four eyes-closed conditions: object-visualization, spatial-visualization, verbalization (6 runs each), and resting (7 runs). After each run, we assessed participants' degrees of object-visual, spatial-visual, and verbal thinking using subjective reports. Before and after the recording, we assessed modality-specific cognitive abilities and styles using nine cognitive tests and two questionnaires. The EEG of all participants, conditions, and runs was clustered into four classes of EEG microstates (A, B, C, and D). RMANOVAs, ANOVAs and post-hoc paired t-tests compared microstate parameters between conditions. TANOVAs compared microstate class topographies between conditions. Differences were localized using eLORETA. Pearson correlations assessed interrelationships between personal modality-specific parameters and EEG microstate parameters during no-task resting. As hypothesized, verbal as opposed to visual conditions consistently affected the duration, occurrence, and coverage of microstate classes A and B. Contrary to associations suggested by previous reports, parameters were increased for class A during visualization, and class B during verbalization. In line with previous reports, microstate D parameters were increased during no-task resting compared to the three internal, goal-directed tasks. Topographic differences between conditions concerned particular sub-regions of components of the metabolic default mode network. Modality-specific personal parameters did not consistently correlate with microstate parameters except verbal cognitive style which correlated negatively with microstate class A duration and positively with class C occurrence. This is the first study that aimed to induce EEG microstate class parameter changes based on their hypothesized functional significance. Beyond, the associations of microstate classes A and B with visual and verbal processing, respectively and microstate class D with interoceptive-autonomic processing, our results suggest that a finely-tuned interplay between all four EEG microstate classes is necessary for the continuous formation of visual and verbal thoughts, as well as interoceptive-autonomic processing. Our results point to the possibility that the EEG microstate classes may represent the head-surface measured activity of intra-cortical sources primarily exhibiting inhibitory functions. However, additional studies are needed to verify and elaborate on this hypothesis.