Mood and Memory: Mood congruity effects in absence of mood

Themood-congruity effect refers to facilitated processing of information when the affective valence of this information is congruent with the subject’s mood. In this paper we argue that mood may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to produce the mood-congruity effect of selective learning. Two experiments are presented in which subjects learned lists of words with neutral, positive, and negative affective valences. In the learning task the subjects were instructed to behave as if they were depressed or happy. The mood-congruity effect was indeed obtained. The effect was stronger with subjects who “predicted” the relationship between mood and affective word valence than with subjects who were unaware of this relationship. The results are not simply attributed to task demands, but are interpreted in terms of a model of cognitive processes and people’s knowledge about mood states.

Modulation of corticospinal activity by strong emotions evoked by pictures and classical music: a transcranial magnetic stimulation study.

Using transcranial magnetic stimulation and skin conductance responses, we sought to clarify if, and to what extent, emotional experiences of different valences and intensity activate the hand-motor system and the associated corticospinal tract. For that purpose, we applied a newly developed method to evoke strong emotional experiences by the simultaneous presentation of musical and pictorial stimuli of congruent emotional valence. We uncovered enhanced motor-evoked potentials, irrespective of valence, during the simultaneous presentation of emotional music and picture stimuli (Combined conditions) compared with the single presentation of the two modalities (Picture/Music conditions). In contrast, vegetative arousal was enhanced during both the Combined and Music conditions, compared with the Picture conditions, again irrespective of emotional valence. These findings strongly indicate that arousal is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for triggering the motor system of the brain. We offer a potential explanation for this discrepant, but intriguing, finding in the paper.

Neural correlates of 'pessimistic' attitude in depression

BACKGROUND Preparing for potentially threatening events in the future is essential for survival. Anticipating the future to be unpleasant is also a cognitive key feature of depression. We hypothesized that 'pessimism'-related emotion processing would characterize brain activity in major depression.MethodDuring functional magnetic resonance imaging, depressed patients and a healthy control group were cued to expect and then perceive pictures of known emotional valences--pleasant, unpleasant and neutral--and stimuli of unknown valence that could have been either pleasant or unpleasant. Brain activation associated with the 'unknown' expectation was compared with the 'known' expectation conditions. RESULTS While anticipating pictures of unknown valence, activation patterns in depressed patients within the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal areas, inferior frontal gyrus, insula and medial thalamus were similar to activations associated with expecting unpleasant pictures, but not with expecting positive pictures. The activity within a majority of these areas correlated with the depression scores. Differences between healthy and depressed persons were found particularly for medial and dorsolateral prefrontal and insular activations. CONCLUSIONS Brain activation in depression during expecting events of unknown emotional valence was comparable with activation while expecting certainly negative, but not positive events. This neurobiological finding is consistent with cognitive models supposing that depressed patients develop a 'pessimistic' attitude towards events with an unknown emotional meaning. Thereby, particularly the role of brain areas associated with the processing of cognitive and executive control and of the internal state is emphasized in contributing to major depression.

Neural correlates of evaluating hazards of high risk.

In personal and in society related context, people often evaluate the risk of environmental and technological hazards. Previous research addressing neuroscience of risk evaluation assessed particularly the direct personal risk of presented stimuli, which may have comprised for instance aspects of fear. Further, risk evaluation primarily was compared to tasks of other cognitive domains serving as control conditions, thus revealing general risk related brain activity, but not such specifically associated with estimating a higher level of risk. We here investigated the neural basis on which lay-persons individually evaluated the risk of different potential hazards for the society. Twenty healthy subjects underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while evaluating the risk of fifty more or less risky conditions presented as written terms. Brain activations during the individual estimations of 'high' against 'low' risk, and of negative versus neutral and positive emotional valences were analyzed. Estimating hazards to be of high risk was associated with activation in medial thalamus, anterior insula, caudate nucleus, cingulate cortex and further prefrontal and temporo-occipital areas. These areas were not involved according to an analysis of the emotion ratings. In conclusion, we emphasize a contribution of the mentioned brain areas involved to signal high risk, here not primarily associated with the emotional valence of the risk items. These areas have earlier been reported to be associated with, beside emotional, viscerosensitive and implicit processing. This leads to assumptions of an intuitive contribution, or a "gut-feeling", not necessarily dependent of the subjective emotional valence, when estimating a high risk of environmental hazards.