Is low self-esteem a risk factor for depression? Findings from a longitudinal study of Mexican-origin youth

We examined the relation between low self-esteem and depression using longitudinal data from a sample of 674 Mexican-origin early adolescents who were assessed at age 10 and 12 years. Results supported the vulnerability model, which states that low self-esteem is a prospective risk factor for depression. Moreover, results suggested that the vulnerability effect of low self-esteem is driven, for the most part, by general evaluations of worth (i.e., global self-esteem), rather than by domain-specific evaluations of academic competence, physical appearance, and competence in peer relationships. The only domain-specific self-evaluation that showed a prospective effect on depression was honesty-trustworthiness. The vulnerability effect of low self-esteem held for male and female adolescents, for adolescents born in the United States versus Mexico, and across different levels of pubertal status. Finally, the vulnerability effect held when we controlled for several theoretically relevant 3rd variables (i.e., social support, maternal depression, stressful events, and relational victimization) and for interactive effects between self-esteem and the 3rd variables. The present study contributes to an emerging understanding of the link between self-esteem and depression and provides much needed data on the antecedents of depression in ethnic minority populations

Do untrustworthy faces facilitate the recognition of antonyms? A critical analysis of thinking the opposite under distrust

Distrust should automatically activate a "thinking the opposite". Thus, according to Schul, Mayo and Burnstein (2004), subjects detect antonyms of adjectives faster when confronted with untrustworthy rather than trustworthy faces. We conducted four experiments within their paradigm to test whether the response latency of detecting antonyms remains stable. We introduced the following changes: the paradigm was applied with and without an induction phase, faces were culturally adapted, the stimuli were presented according more to priming rules, and the canonicity of antonyms was controlled. Results show that the response latency of detecting antonyms is difficult to predict. Even if faces are culturally adapted and priming rules are applied more strictly, response latency depends on whether the induction phase is applied and on the canonicity of antonyms rather than on the trustworthiness of faces. In general, this paradigm seems not to be appropriate to test thinking the opposite under distrust.

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.

The Impact of Human Asset Specificity on the Sourcing of Application Services

The question concerning the circumstances under which it is advantageous for a company to outsource certain information systems functions has been a controversial issue for the last decade. While opponents emphasize the risks of outsourcing based on the loss of strategic potentials and increased transaction costs, proponents emphasize the strategic benefits of outsourcing and high potentials of cost-savings. This paper brings together both views by examining the conditions under which both the strategic potentials as well as savings in production and transaction costs of developing and maintaining software applications can better be achieved in-house as opposed to by an external vendor. We develop a theoretical framework from three complementary theories and test it empirically based on a mail survey of 139 German companies. The results show that insourcing is more cost efficient and advantageous in creating strategic benefits through IS if the provision of application services requires a high amount of firm specific human assets. These relationships, however, are partially moderated by differences in the trustworthiness and intrinsic motivation of internal versus external IS professionals. Moreover, capital shares with an external vendor can lower the risk of high transaction costs as well the risk of loosing the strategic opportunities of an IS.

Generosity is a sign of trustworthiness—the punishment of selfishness is not

Peer-punishment is an important determinant of cooperation in human groups. It has been suggested that, at the proximate level of analysis, punitive preferences can explain why humans incur costs to punish their deviant peers. How punitive preferences could have evolved in humans is still not entirely understood. A possible explanation at the ultimate level of analysis comes from signaling theory. It has been argued that the punishment of defectors can be a type-separating signal of the punisher's cooperative intent. As a result, punishers are selected more often as interaction partners in social exchange and are partly compensated for the costs they incur when punishing defectors. A similar argument has been made with regard to acts of generosity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the punishment of a selfish division of money in a dictator game is a sign of trustworthiness and whether punishers are more trustworthy interaction partners in a trust game than non-punishers. We distinguish between second-party and third-party punishment and compare punitive acts with acts of generosity as signs of trustworthiness. We find that punishers are not more trustworthy than non-punishers and that punishers are not trusted more than non-punishers, both in the second-party and in the third-party punishment condition. To the contrary, second-party punishers are trusted less than their non-punishing counterparts. However, participants who choose a generous division of money are more trustworthy and are trusted more than participants who choose a selfish division or participants about whom no information is available. Our results suggest that, unlike for punitive acts, the signaling benefits of generosity are to be gained in social exchange.