Is there a ‚Depth versus Participation‘ Dilemma in International Cooperation?

Much of the International Relations literature assumes that there is a “depth versus participation” dilemma in international politics: shallower international agreements attract more countries and greater depth is associated with less participation. We argue that this conjecture is too simple and probably misleading because the depth of any given cooperative effort is in fact multidimensional. This multidimensionality manifests itself in the design characteristics of international agreements: in particular, the specificity of obligations, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, positive incentives (assistance), and organizational structures (secretariats). We theorize that the first three of these design characteristics have negative and the latter three have positive effects on participation in international cooperative efforts. Our empirical testing of these claims relies on a dataset that covers more than 200 global environmental treaties. We find a participation-limiting effect for the specificity of obligations, but not for monitoring and enforcement. In contrast, we observe that assistance provisions in treaties have a significant and substantial positive effect on participation. Similarly, dispute settlement mechanisms tend to promote treaty participation. The main implication of our study is that countries do not appear to stay away from agreements with monitoring and enforcement provisions, but that the inclusion of positive incentives and dispute settlement mechanisms can promote international cooperation. In other words, our findings suggest that policymakers do not necessarily need to water down global treaties in order to obtain more participation.

Internationale Kontrolle lokaler Verwaltung in einer Konfliktregion. Das Experiment „Freie Stadt Danzig“ (1920-1939)

The Free City of Danzig was founded by the Allies after World War One to settle the conflict between Poles and Germans as to which territory the town belonged. The League of Nations was designated to be the guarantor of its status. British and American experts and policy advisors saw it as an experiment on the way to new forms of statehood, by means of which nationalism as the founding principle of territorial entities could be overcome. However, the „Free City“ status was rejected by both the city’s inhabitants and German and Polish government agencies, with the result that the League and its local representative, the High Commissioner, were constantly confronted with difficulties in the interpretation of the international treaties and conventions relating to Danzig. In addition, hardly anyone in Danzig, Germany or Poland was interested in the economic and financial situation of the Free City, but were more interested in winning political battles than in the well-being of the city and its inhabitants. As a result, the situation in Danzig became more and more hopeless. The city became increasingly dependent on (illegal) German subsidies, while the High Commissioners generally cared more about their own prestige and that of their home countries than about the interests of the League of Nations. But as no political means of modifying the city’s status had been provided for, nothing changed formally in Danzig until Germany started the Second World War and annexed the city in September 1939. In retrospect, the international control of local government could not contribute to a long-term solution for Danzig. It merely postponed its violent solution for twenty years.

Who Is in Love with Multilateralism? Treaty Commitment in the Post-Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral treaties have again become a central vehicle for international cooperation. In this article, we study states’ commitment to 76 multilateral treaties concluded between 1990 and 2005. The article offers a systematic account of present-day multilateral treaty-making efforts and asks what explains variation in states’ participation as witnessed in the act of treaty ratification.We test existing explanations and provide a novel argument that accounts for the strong participation of new European democracies in multilateral treaties. We find that regime type and being part of the European Union (EU) strongly affect treaty ratification. New EU democracies, in particular, are much more likely to ratify multilateral treaties than are other new democracies.

The Hidden World of Multilateralism? Treaty Commitments of Newly Democratized States in Europe

Why do new EU democracies engage in multilateralism? The dominant explanation proposes that new democracies use international treaties to lock in domestic reforms. This article offers a novel explanation as to why new EU democracies participate in multilateral treaties. We argue that ratifying a treaty serves three external signaling purposes (addressing recognition concerns; increasing strategic autonomy, and pleasing the EU). We test our argument through a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we apply event history analysis. Drawing on a new ratification data set comprising 76 multilateral treaties, we illustrate the prominent role of new EU democracies in multilateralism as compared to other new democracies. Second, to assess the importance of external signaling in the decision to ratify multilateral treaties, we examine parliamentary ratification debates in selected Central and Eastern European countries. Third, we compare parliamentary discussions across European and non-European new democracies to demonstrate the different motives driving their approaches toward multilateralism.

God, the WTO – and hunger

Considering that endemic hunger is a consequence of poverty, and that food is arguably the most basic of all human needs, this book chapter shows one of the more prominent examples of rules and policy fragmentation but also one of the most blatant global governance problems. The three monotheistic religions Judaism, Christians and Islam are surprisingly unanimous about God’s prescriptions on hunger or, put theologically, on what can be said, or should be said, about the interpretations and traditions which, taken together, form the respective and differentiated traditions, identities and views of these beliefs on how to deal with poverty and hunger. A clear social ethos, in the form of global needs satisfaction, runs through both Jewish and Christian texts, and the Qur’an (Zakat). It confirms the value inversion between the world of the mighty and that of the hungry. The message is clear: because salvation is available only through the grace of God, those who have must give to those who have not. This is not charity: it is an inversion of values which can not be addressed by spending 0.7% of your GDP on ODA, and the implication of this sense of redistributive justice is that social offenders will be subject to the Last Judgement. Interestingly, these religious scriptures found their way directly into the human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations and ratified by the parliaments, as a legal base for the duty to protect, to respect and to remedy. On the other side the contradiction with international trade law is all the more flagrant, and it has a direct bearing on poverty: systematic surplus food dumping is still allowed under WTO rules, despite the declared objective ‘to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’. A way forward would be a kind of ‘bottom up’ approach by focusing on extreme cases of food insecurity caused by food dumping, or by export restrictions where a direct effect of food insecurity in other countries can be established. Also, international financing institutions need to review their policies and lending priorities. The same goes for the bilateral investment treaties and a possible ‘public interest’ clause, at least in respect of agricultural land acquisitions in vulnerable countries. The bottom line is this: WTO rules cannot entail a right to violate other, equally binding treaty obligations when its membership as a whole claims to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals and pledges to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.

The WTO and Food Security: What’s Wrong with the Rules?

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the predominant multilateral legal framework governing agricultural trade. The objective of the AoA is to liberalise trade in agriculture through reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. The AoA has not, however, ‘levelled the playing field’ and has not resulted in the equitable distribution of food, particularly for the poorer developing countries. On the other hand, support for small farmers does not ensure food security for the poor. While food security has no simple solutions such as “free trade is good for you”, reform proposals for trade rules which only address agricultural policy instruments fail to account for consumer and other interests: neither tariff reductions and subsidy disciplines, nor safeguards and other measures of producer protection can automatically increase food security. Rather, what is needed is the full and proper implementation of a number of commitments which the international community has already entered into in various human rights treaties, but which even the envisaged results of the now failed Doha Round negotiations could not ensure without revisiting relevant multilateral trade and investment rules.

Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

The Chilean Experience in South-South Trade and Investment Agreements

This paper analyzes the main features of Chilean trade and investment treaties, examining if there is a Chilean pattern in the regulation of trade and investment flows or if it is influenced by agreements signed by Chile with developed countries. The article also examines if there are differences between the treaties signed by Chile and other “Southern” developing countries and those negotiated with “Northern” developed economies, and if sustainable development concerns are part of the negotiations of trade and investment agreements by Chile.