MiniCASCC - A battery driven fog collector for ecosystem research

We developed a small version of the Caltech active strand cloud water collector (CASCC) for biogeochemical investigations in ecological applications. The device is battery powered and thus allows operation at locations where mains power is not available. The collector is designed for sampling periods of up to one week, depending on fog frequency. Our new device is equipped with standard sensors for air temperature, relative humidity, wind, and horizontal visibility for fog detection with a low-cost optical sensor. In mountain areas and during times when clouds are thin the installation of the visibility sensor became a key issue, which limits the potential to estimate liquid water content of the sampled fog. Field tests with 5 devices at three different sites in the Swiss Alps (Niesen) and the Jura Mountains (Lägeren, Switzerland) during two extended summer seasons in 2006 and 2007 showed that in almost all cases it was possible to obtain sample volumes which were large enough for the examination of basic inorganic chemistry of the collected cloud water. Collection rates varied typically from 12 to 30 mL h− 1. The fog droplet cutoff diameter is ≈ 6 μm, which is low enough to include all droplet sizes that are relevant for the liquid water content of typical fog types in the collected samples. From theoretical assumptions of the collection efficiency and theoretical droplet spectra it is possible to estimate the liquid water content of the sampled fog or cloud. Our new fog collector can be constructed and operated at relatively low costs. In combination with chemical and isotopic analyses of the sampled water, this allows to quantify nutrient and pollutant fluxes as is typically needed in ecosystem biogeochemistry studies.

I shouldn't have to do this: Illegitimate tasks as a stressor in relation to organizational control and resource deficits

The performance of tasks that are perceived as unnecessary or unreasonable, illegitimate tasks, represents a new stressor concept that refers to assignments that violate the norms associated with the role requirements of professional work. Research has shown that illegitimate tasks are associated with stress and counterproductive work behaviour. The purpose of this study was to provide insight into the contribution of characteristics of the organization on the prevalence of illegitimate tasks in the work of frontline and middle managers. Using the Bern Illegitimate Task Scale (BITS) in a sample of 440 local government operations managers in 28 different organizations in Sweden, this study supports the theoretical assumptions that illegitimate tasks are positively related to stress and negatively related to satisfaction with work performance. Results further show that 10% of the variance in illegitimate tasks can be attributed to the organization where the managers work. Multilevel referential analysis showed that the more the organization was characterized by competition for resources between units, unfair and arbitrary resource allocation and obscure decisional structure, the more illegitimate tasks managers reported. These results should be valuable for strategic-level management since they indicate that illegitimate tasks can be counteracted by means of the organization of work.

The implicit achievement motive and general life stress affect time spent on competitive matches in racquet sports

The match time spent on court in racquet sports can be perceived as dependent on the effort an athlete is willing to exert in a competition. Achievement motivation is defined as the effort a person spends on a difficult task with the completion of which she wants to meet a personal standard of excellence, wants to improve herself, or outperform others (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). Fifty-two professionals of three racquet sports (tennis, table tennis, and badminton) filled in a questionnaire on their explicit achievement motive, a scale on general life stress, and a measure of the implicit achievement motive. Results indicate that the implicit but not the explicit achievement motive was able to predict the athletes' time spent on court (effort). Additionally the general life stress scale was negatively related to time spent on court. Findings are in line with theoretical assumptions that actual behavior is linked to the implicit achievement motive and that higher levels of general life stress lead to impaired performance in sports.

A Dynamical Tool to Study the Cultural Context of Conflict Escalation

The present article describes research in progress which is developing a simple, replicable methodology aimed at identifying the regularities and specificity of human behavior in conflict escalation and de-escalation prooesses. These research efforts will ultimately be used to study conflict dynamics across cultures. The experimental data collected through this methodology, together with case studies and aggregated, time-series macro data are key for identifying relevant parameters, systems' properties, and micromechanisms defining the behavior of naturally occurring conflict escalation and de-escalation dynamics. This, in turn, is critical for the development of realistic, empirically supported computational models. The article outlines the theoretical assumptions of Dynamical Systems Theory with regard to conflict dynamics, with an emphasis on the process of conflict escalation and de-escalation. Next, work on a methodology for empirical study of escalation processes from a DST perspective is outlined. Specifically, the development of a progressive scenario methodology designed to map escalation sequences, together with anexample of a preliminary study based on the proposed researcb paradigm, is presented. Implications of the approach for the study of culture are discussed.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.