Comparative theoretical analysis of continuous wave laser cutting of metals at 1 and 10 um wavelength

We present a derivation and, based on it, an extension of a model originally proposed by V.G. Niziev to describe continuous wave laser cutting of metals. Starting from a local energy balance and by incorporating heat removal through heat conduction to the bulk material, we find a differential equation for the cutting profile. This equation is solved numerically and yields, besides the cutting profiles, the maximum cutting speed, the absorptivity profiles, and other relevant quantities. Our main goal is to demonstrate the model’s capability to explain some of the experimentally observed differences between laser cutting at around 1 and 10 μm wavelengths. To compare our numerical results to experimental observations, we perform simulations for exactly the same material and laser beam parameters as those used in a recent comparative experimental study. Generally, we find good agreement between theoretical and experimental results and show that the main differences between laser cutting with 1- and 10-μm beams arise from the different absorptivity profiles and absorbed intensities. Especially the latter suggests that the energy transfer, and thus the laser cutting process, is more efficient in the case of laser cutting with 1-μm beams.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Meta-analysis and dose-response metaregression: circulating insulin-like growth factor I (IGF-I) and mortality

Context: IGF-I plays a central role in metabolism and growth regulation. High IGF-I levels are associated with increased cancer risk and low IGF-I levels with increased risk for cardiovascular disease. Objective: Our objective was to determine the relationship between circulating IGF-I levels and mortality in the general population using random-effects meta-analysis and dose-response metaregression. Data Sources: We searched PubMed, EMBASE, Web of Science, and Cochrane Library from 1985 to September 2010 to identify relevant studies. Study Selection: Population-based cohort studies and (nested) case-control studies reporting on the relation between circulating IGF-I and mortality were assessed for eligibility. Data Extraction: Data extraction was performed by two investigators independently, using a standardized data extraction sheet. Data Synthesis: Twelve studies, with 14,906 participants, were included. Overall, risk of bias was limited. Mortality in subjects with low or high IGF-I levels was compared with mid-centile reference categories. All-cause mortality was increased in subjects with low as well as high IGF-I, with a hazard ratio (HR) of 1.27 (95% CI = 1.08–1.49) and HR of 1.18 (95% CI = 1.04–1.34), respectively. Dose-response metaregression showed a U-shaped relation of IGF-I and all-cause mortality (P = 0.003). The predicted HR for the increase in mortality comparing the 10th IGF-I with the 50th percentile was 1.56 (95% CI = 1.31–1.86); the predicted HR comparing the 90th with the 50th percentile was 1.29 (95% CI = 1.06–1.58). A U-shaped relationship was present for both cancer mortality and cardiovascular mortality. Conclusions: Both low and high IGF-I concentrations are associated with increased mortality in the general population.

Voter Participation in the 1998 Bundestag Elections: A Theoretical Modification and Empirical Application of Downs’ Theory of Voter Participation

This article seeks to contribute to the illumination of the so-called 'paradox of voting' using the German Bundestag elections of 1998 as an empirical case. Downs' model of voter participation will be extended to include elements of the theory of subjective expected utility (SEU). This will allow a theoretical and empirical exploration of the crucial mechanisms of individual voters' decisions to participate, or abstain from voting, in the German general election of 1998. It will be argued that the infinitely low probability of an individual citizen's vote to decide the election outcome will not necessarily reduce the probability of electoral participation. The empirical analysis is largely based on data from the ALLBUS 1998. It confirms the predictions derived from SEU theory. The voters' expected benefits and their subjective expectation to be able to influence government policy by voting are the crucial mechanisms to explain participation. By contrast, the explanatory contribution of perceived information and opportunity costs is low.

Understanding virtual experience and telepresence - a review and synthesis of literature

To enable buyers to be better informed before purchasing, products and services can be virtually experienced on the internet. Research into virtual experience (VE) and the related construct of telepresence (TP) as means of online marketing has made great progress in recent years. However, there is still disagreement in the literature concerning the exact understanding of these terms. In this study, the two terms are analyzed by means of a systematically executed literature review, differentiated from one another, and their understandings explained. This study is to our knowledge the first to compare the concepts of VE and TP in a systematic way. The analysis shows that TP is regarded as the feeling of presence conveyed by a communication medium. VE, on the other hand, is to be defined as an active state of a consumer through the use of computer-based presentation formats, and constituting a subtype of TP. These findings are intended to help VE and TP become more uniformly understood and make it easier to compare the results of future studies. Finally, from the literature review, it is possible to derive focal points for research in future studies.

Endovascular treatment for acute ischemic stroke patients: implications and interpretation of IMS III, MR RESCUE, and SYNTHESIS EXPANSION trials: A report from the Working Group of International Congress of Interventional Neurology

OBJECTIVE The results of Interventional Management of Stroke (IMS) III, Magnetic Resonance and REcanalization of Stroke Clots Using Embolectomy (MR RESCUE), and SYNTHESIS EXPANSION trials are expected to affect the practice of endovascular treatment for acute ischemic stroke. The purpose of this report is to review the components of the designs and methods of these trials and to describe the influence of those components on the interpretation of trial results. METHODS A critical review of trial design and conduct of IMS III, MR RESCUE, and SYNTHESIS EXPANSION is performed with emphasis on patient selection, shortcomings in procedural aspects, and methodology of data ascertainment and analysis. The influence of each component is estimated based on published literature including multicenter clinical trials reporting on endovascular treatment for acute ischemic stroke and myocardial infarction. RESULTS We critically examined the time interval between symptom onset and treatment and rates of angiographic recanalization to differentiate between "endovascular treatment" and "parameter optimized endovascular treatment" as it relates to the IMS III, MR RESCUE, and SYNTHESIS EXPANSION trials. All the three trials failed to effectively test "parameter optimized endovascular treatment" due to the delay between symptom onset and treatment and less than optimal rates of recanalization. In all the three trials, the magnitude of benefit with endovascular treatment required to reject the null hypothesis was larger than could be expected based on previous studies. The IMS III and SYNTHESIS EXPANSION trials demonstrated that rates of symptomatic intracerebral hemorrhages subsequent to treatment are similar between IV thrombolytics and endovascular treatment in matched acute ischemic stroke patients. The trials also indirectly validated the superiority/equivalence of IV thrombolytics (compared with endovascular treatment) in patients with minor neurological deficits and those without large vessel occlusion on computed tomographic/magnetic resonance angiography. CONCLUSIONS The results do not support a large magnitude benefit of endovascular treatment in subjects randomized in all the three trials. The possibility that benefits of a smaller magnitude exist in certain patient populations cannot be excluded. Large magnitude benefits can be expected with implementation of "parameter optimized endovascular treatment" in patients with ischemic stroke who are candidates for IV thrombolytics.

Social Network Analysis and Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Their mutual benefit for the explanation of policy network structures

By switching the level of analysis and aggregating data from the micro-level of individual cases to the macro-level, quantitative data can be analysed within a more case-based approach. This paper presents such an approach in two steps: In a first step, it discusses the combination of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) in a sequential mixed-methods research design. In such a design, quantitative social network data on individual cases and their relations at the micro-level are used to describe the structure of the network that these cases constitute at the macro-level. Different network structures can then be compared by QCA. This strategy allows adding an element of potential causal explanation to SNA, while SNA-indicators allow for a systematic description of the cases to be compared by QCA. Because mixing methods can be a promising, but also a risky endeavour, the methodological part also discusses the possibility that underlying assumptions of both methods could clash. In a second step, the research design presented beforehand is applied to an empirical study of policy network structures in Swiss politics. Through a comparison of 11 policy networks, causal paths that lead to a conflictual or consensual policy network structure are identified and discussed. The analysis reveals that different theoretical factors matter and that multiple conjunctural causation is at work. Based on both the methodological discussion and the empirical application, it appears that a combination of SNA and QCA can represent a helpful methodological design for social science research and a possibility of using quantitative data with a more case-based approach.