Racing against Time: Varying Patterns of Social Mobilization in Serbia and Georgia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a number of actors started to engage in the power struggle for the opportunities to shape the new order in successive nation-states. In Serbia and Georgia historically hegemonic Orthodox Christian churches were among the firsts in the frontlines for political and economic power. More than a decade has passed since the so-called Coloured Revolutions in Georgia and Serbia, and the Orthodox churches still remain participants of an ongoing socio-political transition of these states. The revival of public role of religion appeared temporary in Serbia followed by a gradual decline of an influence of the Orthodox Church over political life and legal process. However, in Georgia the public and political role of religion increased rather than declined albeit changed shape. Examining the degree to which the two Orthodox churches can influence the political agenda in Serbia and Georgia, the paper attempts to understand how church-State relations work in practice. By bringing rich empirical data from the field (70 interviews with (arch)bishops, priests and religious clerics in Georgia and Serbia added to field observations), the paper reflects on the themes under which the two Orthodox churches mobilize public protest in Serbia and Georgia. The paper further looks at varying State responses and their broader implication for church-state problematique.

Cleverer than we thought: the change in discourse of the Georgian Orthodox Church

This paper will focus on three episodes of contemporary church-state relations in Georgia, in particular, the conflicting interaction between law and religion in the public space. The first episode will be an open confrontation between the church and the state over the law on Registration of Religious Minority organizations (2011) which allowed the religious minorities to freely register; second: the Law on Self-governance (2013) which Georgian Orthodox Church considered “a threat to territorial integrity of Georgia”; and lastly: the Law on Anti-discrimination (2014) which was deemed “legitimization of Sodomic sin”. By reflecting on the three examples where for the first time after the collapse of Soviet Union, the Georgian state openly confronted the church and made a decision notwithstanding its position, I will attempt to argue that the role of the Orthodox Church in influencing the law making process is in gradual decline. However, on the other hand, by presenting the results of an ethnographic study conducted in 23 eparchies and perishes in 7 regions of Georgia in 2014, I will also show that church has adapted to its declining role over policy making, and to regain its political influence it gradually started to employ a civic rather than ethno nationalist discourse on matters of religious freedom while engaging with government. The paper will suggest that both unilateral decision-making of the state and civic shift in the discourse of the church constitute an important change in understanding church-state dynamics in the post-communist Orthodox Christianity dominated society.

An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State and Nation in Contemporary Georgia

I will attempt to problematize the typologies of nationalism when applied to the Georgian context, particularly in relationship to nationalism of President Mikheil Saakashvili. I will argue that the state-driven nationalism of post-Rose Revolution government was a hybrid form of ethno-cultural and civic which had elements of ethnic particularism towards the Orthodox Church. By reflecting on the growing assistance of Western institutions to Georgia, I will problematize the extent to which the rise of American and European involvement in the region reinforced the perceptions of the “self” and the “other” among the religious elites since the Rose Revolution. By presenting field research data (interviews) gathered in 23 eparchies and perishes with religious clerics in 7 regions of Georgia, I will argue that religious nationalism in Georgia strengthened not in response to but as an outcome of President Saakashvili’s policies towards the church, and partially as a reaction to the growing dissatisfaction with Western institutions working in Georgia and Western governments’ response to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. By reflecting on empirical material, the paper attempts to problematize an understanding of religious nationalism as a social movement, an instance of cultural autonomy and a source of identity (Friedland 2001). In response, I suggest viewing religious nationalism in post-communist Georgia as medium of material and political interests

CAP Reform vs WTO: Crop Diversification or Crop Rotation? : Legal opinion prepared by Dr. Christian Häberli at the request of APRODEV, the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe

The European Commission’s proposals for the Legislative Framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the period 2014-2020 include, inter alia, the introduction of a “strong greening component”. For the first time, all EU farmers in receipt of support are to “go beyond the requirements of cross compliance and deliver environmental and climate benefits as part of their everyday activities crop diversification as a contribution to all EU farmers in receipt of support go beyond the requirements of cross compliance and deliver environmental and climate benefits as part of their everyday activities.” In a legal opinion prepared at the request of APRODEV, the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (www.aprodev.eu), Christian Häberli examines the WTO implications of this proposal, as compared with an alternative proposal to rather link direct payments to crop rotation. The conclusions are twofold: 1. Crop rotation is at least as likely to be found Green Box-compatible as crop diversification. Moreover, it will be more difficult to argue that crop diversification is “not more than minimally production-distorting” because it entails for most farmers less cost and work. 2. Even if (either of the two cropping schemes) were to be found “amber”, the EU would not have to relinquish this conditionality. This is because the direct payments involved would in all likelihood not, together with the other price support instruments, exceed the amount available under the presently scheduled maximum.