Regulation of the Telecommunications in Switzerland: A Network Approach to Assess the Regulatory Agencies' Independence

The liberalization process of the Swiss telecommunications sector follows a logic of ‘autonomous adaptation’ to the regulations of the European Union (EU). Switzerland, which is not a Member State of the EU, voluntarily adapts to the European policy without being for- mally required to do so (Sciarini et al., 2004). This process went hand in hand with the partial privatization of the legal statute and assets of the former monopolist and with the re-regulation of the liberalized telecommunications sector.

A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies

This article uses a policy network perspective to assess the independence of regulatory agencies (RAs) in liberalized public utility sectors. We focus on the de facto independence of RAs from elected politicians, regulatees and other co-regulators. We go further than previous studies, which only undertook a general analysis of the de jure independence of RAs from political authorities. Specifically, we apply a social network analysis (SNA), which concentrates on the attributes and relational profiles of all actors involved in new regulatory arrangements. The concept of de facto independence is applied to the Swiss telecommunications sector in order to provide initial empirical insights. Results clearly show that SNA indicators are an appropriate tool to identify the de facto independence of RAs and can improve knowledge about the issues arising from the emergence of the ‘regulatory State’.

European Community Communications Law : An Introduction

The present article is an abridged version of a chapter to the book EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May, 2007). It provides an introduction to the rules at the European Community level governing the electronic communications sector (previously and more traditionally referred to as telecommunications). Such an introduction encompasses essentially an enquiry into the relevant competition law rules, of which here particular attention is paid to abuse of dominant position and the essential facilities doctrine, as well as an analysis of the EC sector specific regulatory framework, which has substantially evolved since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector back in the beginning of the 1990s. It is the objective of the article to explore to what extent both regulatory tools could deal with the specificities of communications markets, and where they may fail to do so.