Extended-spectrum cephalosporin-resistant Gram-negative organisms in livestock: an emerging problem for human health?

Escherichia coli, Salmonella spp. and Acinetobacter spp. are important human pathogens. Serious infections due to these organisms are usually treated with extended-spectrum cephalosporins (ESCs). However, in the past two decades we have faced a rapid increasing of infections and colonization caused by ESC-resistant (ESC-R) isolates due to production of extended-spectrum-β-lactamases (ESBLs), plasmid-mediated AmpCs (pAmpCs) and/or carbapenemase enzymes. This situation limits drastically our therapeutic armamentarium and puts under peril the human health. Animals are considered as potential reservoirs of multidrug-resistant (MDR) Gram-negative organisms. The massive and indiscriminate use of antibiotics in veterinary medicine has contributed to the selection of ESC-R E. coli, ESC-R Salmonella spp. and, to less extent, MDR Acinetobacter spp. among animals, food, and environment. This complex scenario is responsible for the expansion of these MDR organisms which may have life-threatening clinical significance. Nowadays, the prevalence of food-producing animals carrying ESC-R E. coli and ESC-R Salmonella (especially those producing CTX-M-type ESBLs and the CMY-2 pAmpC) has reached worryingly high values. More recently, the appearance of carbapenem-resistant isolates (i.e., VIM-1-producing Enterobacteriaceae and NDM-1 or OXA-23-producing Acinetobacter spp.) in livestock has even drawn greater concerns. In this review, we describe the aspects related to the spread of the above MDR organisms among pigs, cattle, and poultry, focusing on epidemiology, molecular mechanisms of resistance, impact of antibiotic use, and strategies to contain the overall problem. The link and the impact of ESC-R organisms of livestock origin for the human scenario are also discussed.

Three essays on prices and selection

Competitive Market Segmentation Abstract In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that the customers' valuation of quality is identical across firms. Once we relax this assumption, competition across qualities leads to second-degree price discrimination. We find that markups on low-quality products are higher if consuming a low-quality product involves a firm-specific disutility. Likewise, markups on high-quality products are higher if consuming a high-quality product creates a firm-specific surplus. Selection upon Wage Posting Abstract We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries. Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm, the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called "positive selection" leads to market failure. Thus our model provides a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors. Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices Abstract In a setting where retailers and suppliers compete for each other by offering binding contracts, exclusivity clauses serve as a competitive device. As a result of these clauses, firms addressed by contracts only accept the most favorable deal. Thus the contract-issuing parties have to squeeze their final customers and transfer the surplus within the vertical supply chain. We elaborate to what extent the resulting allocation depends on the sequence of play and discuss the implications of a ban on exclusivity clauses.

Policy Instrument Selection under Uncertainty: The Case of Micropollution Regulation

The paper addresses the question of which factors drive the formation of policy preferences when there are remaining uncertainties about the causes and effects of the problem at stake. To answer this question we examine policy preferences reducing aquatic micropollutants, a specific case of water protection policy and different actor groups (e.g. state, science, target groups). Here, we contrast two types of policy preferences: a) preventive or source-directed policies, which mitigate pollution in order to avoid contact with water; and b) reactive or end-of-pipe policies, which filter water already contaminated by pollutants. In a second step, we analyze the drivers for actors’ policy preferences by focusing on three sets of explanations, i.e. participation, affectedness and international collaborations. The analysis of our survey data, qualitative interviews and regression analysis of the Swiss political elite show that participation in the policy-making process leads to knowledge exchange and reduces uncertainties about the policy problem, which promotes preferences for preventive policies. Likewise, actors who are affected by the consequences of micropollutants, such as consumer or environmental associations, opt for anticipatory policies. Interestingly, we find that uncertainties about the effectiveness of preventive policies can promote preferences for end-of-pipe policies. While preventive measures often rely on (uncertain) behavioral changes of target groups, reactive policies are more reliable when it comes to fulfilling defined policy goals. Finally, we find that in a transboundary water management context, actors with international collaborations prefer policies that produce immediate and reliable outcomes.

Continental-Scale Footprint of Balancing and Positive Selection in a Small Rodent (Microtus arvalis)

Genetic adaptation to different environmental conditions is expected to lead to large differences between populations at selected loci, thus providing a signature of positive selection. Whereas balancing selection can maintain polymorphisms over long evolutionary periods and even geographic scale, thus leads to low levels of divergence between populations at selected loci. However, little is known about the relative importance of these two selective forces in shaping genomic diversity, partly due to difficulties in recognizing balancing selection in species showing low levels of differentiation. Here we address this problem by studying genomic diversity in the European common vole (Microtus arvalis) presenting high levels of differentiation between populations (average FST = 0.31). We studied 3,839 Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphism (AFLP) markers genotyped in 444 individuals from 21 populations distributed across the European continent and hence over different environmental conditions. Our statistical approach to detect markers under selection is based on a Bayesian method specifically developed for AFLP markers, which treats AFLPs as a nearly codominant marker system, and therefore has increased power to detect selection. The high number of screened populations allowed us to detect the signature of balancing selection across a large geographic area. We detected 33 markers potentially under balancing selection, hence strong evidence of stabilizing selection in 21 populations across Europe. However, our analyses identified four-times more markers (138) being under positive selection, and geographical patterns suggest that some of these markers are probably associated with alpine regions, which seem to have environmental conditions that favour adaptation. We conclude that despite favourable conditions in this study for the detection of balancing selection, this evolutionary force seems to play a relatively minor role in shaping the genomic diversity of the common vole, which is more influenced by positive selection and neutral processes like drift and demographic history.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.