2 resultados para Sugar-cane agro-industry. Conservation unity. Social impacts. Fisher´s community
em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça
Resumo:
More than 40 years after the agrarian reform, Peru is experiencing a renewed process of concentration of land ownership in the hands of large-scale investors, favoring the development of a sugar cane production cluster along the northern coast. The expansion of the agricultural frontier by means of large irrigation projects – originally developed to benefit medium- and small-scale farmers – is carried out today in order to be sold to large-scale investors for the production of export crops. In the region of Piura the increasing presence of large-scale biofuel investors puts substantial pressure on land and water resources, not only changing the use of and access to land for local communities, but also generating water shortages vis-à-vis the multiple water demands of local food producers. The changes in land relations and the agro-ecosystem, the altering food production regime as well as the increasing proletarization of smallholders, is driving many locals – even those which (initially) welcomed the investment – into resistance activities against the increasing control of land, water and other natural resources in the hands of agribusinesses. The aim of this presentation is to discuss the contemporary political, social and cultural dynamics of agrarian change along the northern Peruvian coast as well as the «reactions from below» emanating from campesino communities, landless laborers, brick producers, pastoralists as well as other marginalized groups. The different strategies, forms and practices of resistance with the goal of the «protection of the territory» shall be explored as well as the reasons for their rather scattered occurrence and the lack of alliances on the land issue. This input shall make a contribution to the on-going debate on individual and communal property rights and the question of what is best in terms of collective defense against land grabbing.
Resumo:
“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?