Exploring Magic Realism in Salman Rushdie's Fiction

Kluwick breaks new ground in this book, moving away from Rushdie studies that focus on his status as postcolonial or postmodern, and instead considering the significance of magic realism in his fiction. Rushdie’s magic realism, in fact, lies at the heart of his engagement with the post/colonial. In a departure from conventional descriptions of magic realism—based primarily on the Latin-American tradition—Kluwick here proposes an alternative definition, allowing for a more accurate description of the form. She argues that it is disharmony, rather than harmony, that is decisive: that the incompatibility of the realist and the supernatural needs to be recognized as a driving force in Rushdie’s fiction. In its rigorous analysis of this Rushdian magic realism, this book considers the entire corpus—Midnight’s Children, Shame, The Satanic Verses, The Moor’s Last Sigh, The Ground Beneath Her Feet, Shalimar the Clown, and The Enchantress of Florence. This study is the first of its kind to do so.

Addressing Multilevel Program Complexity by Evaluation Design

In this paper, we present the evaluation design for a complex multilevel program recently introduced in Switzerland. The evaluation embraces the federal level, the cantonal program level, and the project level where target groups are directly addressed. We employ Pawson and Tilley’s realist evaluation approach, in order to do justice to the varying context factors that impact the cantonal programs leading to varying effectiveness of the implemented activities. The application of the model to the canton of Uri shows that the numerous vertical and horizontal relations play a crucial role for the program’s effectiveness. As a general learning for the evaluation of complex programs, we state that there is a need to consider all affected levels of a program and that no monocausal effects can be singled out in programs where multiple interventions address the same problem. Moreover, considering all affected levels of a program can mean going beyond the borders of the actual program organization and including factors that do not directly interfere with the policy delivery as such. In particular, we found that the relationship between the cantonal and the federal level was a crucial organizational factor influencing the effectiveness of the cantonal program.

Wright’s Version of Critical Realism

N. T. Wright’s research project “Christian Origins and the Question of God” is characterized by its use of the method of critical realism. Now, “critical realism” is a term that has been used in connection with different epistemo-logical positions because the term has been “constantly reinvented.” It is very easy to make up a term when one wants to distinguish oneself from an assumed naïve approach to reality. As has been observed earlier, the use of a distinct term does not necessarily mean the same if used by another author; the context is important. One has to track literal dependencies to evaluate whether continuity with former uses of a term is intended. That is to say, the term “critical realism” has proven to be equivocal, although this has rarely been noticed . This does not mean that taking such a critical realist stance cannot present a decisive advantage over rather unreflective approaches to whatever sort of reality. Nevertheless, philosophically it can probably only be a start. The purpose of this contribution to this compendium will be to analyze the content claims and the status of N. T. Wright’s critical realism in these regards, with a special emphasis on Paul and the Faithfulness of God, of course.

Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives

I argue that scientific realism, insofar as it is only committed to those scientific posits of which we have causal knowledge, is immune to Kyle Stanford’s argument from unconceived alternatives. This causal strategy (previously introduced, but not worked out in detail, by Anjan Chakravartty) is shown not to repeat the shortcomings of previous realist responses to Stanford’s argument. Furthermore, I show that the notion of causal knowledge underlying it can be made sufficiently precise by means of conceptual tools recently introduced into the debate on scientific realism. Finally, I apply this strategy to the case of Jean Perrin’s experimental work on the atomic hypothesis, disputing Stanford’s claim that the problem of unconceived alternatives invalidates a realist interpretation of this historical episode.