Two ways to common knowledge

It is not clear what a system for evidence-based common knowledge should look like if common knowledge is treated as a greatest fixed point. This paper is a preliminary step towards such a system. We argue that the standard induction rule is not well suited to axiomatize evidence-based common knowledge. As an alternative, we study two different deductive systems for the logic of common knowledge. The first system makes use of an induction axiom whereas the second one is based on co-inductive proof theory. We show the soundness and completeness for both systems.

Sustainable land management: A new approach to soil and water conservation in Ethiopia

Many efforts have been made in Ethiopia to mitigate land degradation, particularly soil erosion, through both local and newly introduced soil and water conservation (SWC) practices. However, the strict focus on soil erosion and conservation does not necessarily lead to satisfactory results. If SWC is effective in reducing erosion but is at the same time too costly and unacceptable to land users, sooner or later it will disappear and its positive effects will also be lost. This book therefore suggests to follow the broader approach of Sustainable Land Management (SLM), which aims at ecological soundness, economic viability and social acceptability, and thus places SWC in a more holistic framework that is closer to farmers’ reality.

[Mass culling in the context of animal disease outbreaks--veterinarians caught between ethical issues and control policies]

In recent years controversial discussions arose during major animal disease outbreaks in the EU about the ethical soundness of mass culling. In contrast to numerous publications about ethical issues and laboratory animals/animal experiments, literature concerning ethical deliberations in the case of mass culling as a means of outbreak control remain scarce. Veterinarians in charge of decision about and implementation of mass culling actions find themselves in an area of conflict in between the officially required animal disease control policy and a public that is increasingly critical. Those veterinarians are faced with the challenge to defend the relevant decisions against all stakeholders and also themselves. In this context an interdisciplinary workshop was initiated in Switzerland in October 2007 with ethicians and (official) veterinarians from Germany, Switzerland and Austria. With the aim to identify ethical components of animal disease control for official veterinarians, talks and moderated group discussions took place. This article summarizes selected discussion points and conclusions.

Subjective and objective perception of orthodontic treatment need: a systematic review

The aim of this work was to investigate the published evidence on the comparison of self-perception and diagnosis of orthodontic treatment need. A search of Cochrane Library, MEDLINE, Scopus databases, and archives of two orthodontic journals was carried out from January 1966 to August 2011 by the two authors using Medical Subject Heading terms. Studies that investigated solely either self-perception of orthodontic need by laypersons or assessment of orthodontic need by professionals were excluded from the data analysis. The methodological soundness of each study and the aggregate level of evidence were evaluated according to predetermined criteria. Moderate level of evidence, the relatively highest grade, was assigned to 9.1 per cent of the 22 studies, finally included in the data analysis. The overall evidence level provided by the evaluated publications was rated as limited. However, the existing body of evidence indicated a highly variable association between self-perception of orthodontic treatment need and orthodontist's assessment. Future controlled studies with well-defined samples and common assessment methodology will clarify further the relationship between perception of treatment need by laypersons and orthodontists and enhance international comparison and development of health care strategies.

Socrates on the Moral Mischief of Misology

In Plato’s dialogues, the Phaedo, Laches, and Republic, Socrates warns his interlocutors about the dangers of misology. Misology is explained by analogy with misanthropy, not as the hatred of other human beings, but as the hatred of the logos or reasonable discourse. According to Socrates, misology arises when a person alternates between believing an argument to be correct, and then refuting it as false. If Socrates is right, then misanthropy is sometimes instilled when a person goes from trusting people to learning that others sometimes betray our reliance and expectations, and finally not to placing any confidence whatsoever in other people, or, in the case of misology, in the correctness or trustworthiness of arguments. A cynical indifference to the soundness of arguments generally is sometimes associated with Socrates’ polemical targets, the Sophists, at least as Plato represents Socrates’ reaction to these itinerant teachers of rhetoric, public speaking and the fashioning of arguments suitable to any occasion. Socrates’ injunctions against misology are largely moral, pronouncing it ‘shameful’ and ‘very wicked’, and something that without further justification we must ‘guard against’, maintaining that we will be less excellent persons if we come to despise argument as lacking the potential of leading to the truth. I examine Socrates’ moral objections to misology which I show to be inconclusive. I consider instead the problem of logical coherence in the motivations supposedly underlying misology, and conclude that misology as Socrates intends the concept is an emotional reaction to argumentation on the part of persons who have not acquired the logical dialectical skills or will to sort out good from bad arguments. We cannot dismiss argument as directed toward the truth unless we have a strong reason for doing so, and any such argument must itself presuppose that at least some reasoning can be justified in discovering and justifying belief in interesting truths. The relevant passages from Socrates’ discussion of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo are discussed in detail, and set in scholarly background against Socrates’ philosophy more generally, as represented by Plato’s dialogues. I conclude by offering a suggestive list of practical remedies to avoid the alienation from argument in dialectic with which Socrates is concerned.

Probabilistic Justification Logic

We present a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, to study rational belief, degrees of belief and justifications. We establish soundness and completeness for PPJ and show that its satisfiability problem is decidable. In the last part we use PPJ to provide a solution to the lottery paradox.