8 resultados para Social theory and historiography

em BORIS: Bern Open Repository and Information System - Berna - Suiça


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Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.

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According to life-history theory age-dependent investments into reproduction are thought to co-vary with survival and growth of animals. In polygynous species, in which size is an important determinant of reproductive success, male reproduction via alternative mating tactics at young age are consequently expected to be the less frequent in species with higher survival. We tested this hypothesis in male Alpine ibex (Capra ibex), a highly sexually dimorphic mountain ungulate whose males have been reported to exhibit extremely high adult survival rates. Using data from two offspring cohorts in a population in the Swiss Alps, the effects of age, dominance and mating tactic on the likelihood of paternity were inferred within a Bayesian framework. In accordance with our hypothesis, reproductive success in male Alpine ibex was heavily biased towards older, dominant males that monopolized access to receptive females by adopting the 'tending' tactic, while success among young, subordinate males via the sneaking tactic 'coursing' was in general low and rare. In addition, we detected a high reproductive skew in male Alpine ibex, suggesting a large opportunity for selection. Compared with other ungulates with higher mortality rates, reproduction among young male Alpine ibex was much lower and more sporadic. Consistent with that, further examinations on the species level indicated that in polygynous ungulates the significance of early reproduction appears to decrease with increasing survival. Overall, this study supports the theory that survival prospects of males modulate the investments into reproduction via alternative mating tactics early in life. In the case of male Alpine ibex, the results indicate that their life-history strategy targets for long life, slow and prolonged growth and late reproduction.

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This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

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The European Territorial Cohesion Policy has been the subject of numerous debates in recent years. Most contributions focus on understanding the term itself and figuring out what is behind it, or arguing for or against a stronger formal competence of the European Union in this field. This article will leave out these aspects and pay attention to (undefined and legally non-binding) conceptual elements of territorial cohesion, focusing on the challenge of linking it within spatial policies and organising the relations. Therefore, the theoretical approach of Cultural Theory and its concept of clumsy solution are applied to overcome the dilemma of typical dichotomies by adding a third and a fourth (but not a fifth) perspective. In doing so, normative contradictions between different rational approaches can be revealed, explained and approached with the concept of ‘clumsy solutions’. This contribution aims at discussing how this theoretical approach helps us explain and frame a coalition between the Territorial Cohesion Policy and spatial policies. This approach contributes to finding the best way of linking and organising policies, although the solution might be clumsy according to the different rationalities involved.