Principal-Agent Theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex Agency and ‘Missing Delegation’

This paper analyses the World Trade Organization within a principal-agent framework. The concept of complex agency is introduced to focus on the variety of actors that comprise an international organization. Special attention is paid to the relationship between contracting parties’ representatives and the Secretariat. In the empirical part, the paper analyses the role of the Secretariat in assisting negotiations and presents evidence of declining influence. It is shown how principal-agent theory can contribute to addressing this ‘puzzle of missing delegation’. The paper concludes with a cautionary note as to the ‘location’ of international organizations’ emerging pathologies and calls for additional research to address the relationship between material and social sources to explain behaviour of the key actors within the complex agency.

Partiality, Agent-Relative Reasons, and the Individuals View

The paper offers a critical discussion of Simon Keller’s individuals view concerning the grounds of special obligations. It is argued that the view offers a misleading account of agent-relative reasons, which leads to problems with the arguments Keller offers for his view – the Kantian, consequentialist, particularistic argument. Furthermore, it argues that Keller’s argument from phenomenology suffers from not distinguishing between reasons for partiality and reasons from partiality. At best, it can be applied to reasons from partiality – reasons that agents have in virtue of standing in a relationship of partiality with some other person. Thus, the argument does not support the individuals view, as it is compatible with the other approaches Keller discusses. The paper suggests a modified relationship view to ground reasons of partiality.