Shareholder Value Maximization: What Managers Say and What They Do

This paper examines whether Swiss firms maximize shareholder value. To find out, we survey the goals of 313 listed and unlisted firms. We then examine whether managers’ decisions are consistent with their goals and analyze whether performance corresponds to intentions. Our results show that most managers pursue conflicting targets. Many also declare that they do not maximize shareholder value. And those who claim they do sometimes rely on investment criteria that are inconsistent with that target. Finally, we find that share-price performance is marginally better when managers claim to maximize shareholder value, particularly when stock prices have fallen.

When Shareholders choose not to Maximize Value: The Union Bank of Switzerland's 1994 Proxy Fight

The staid Union Bank of Switzerland, in a very close vote, won the support of its shareholders in its battle against an attempt by dissidents to guide the way the nation's biggest bank is run. The special shareholder vote, held in a packed Zurich sports hall, was one of the most keenly awaited events in recent Swiss financial histroy. The Wall Street Journal, November 23, 1994