The Wabar impact craters, Saudi Arabia, revisited

The very young Wabar craters formed by impact of an iron meteorite and are known to the scientific community since 1933. We describe field observations made during a visit to the Wabar impact site, provide analytical data on the material collected, and combine these data with poorly known information discovered during the recovery of the largest meteorites. During our visit in March 2008, only two craters (Philby-B and 11 m) were visible; Philby-A was completely covered by sand. Mapping of the ejecta field showed that the outcrops are strongly changing over time. Combining information from different visitors with our own and satellite images, we estimate that the large seif dunes over the impact site migrate by approximately 1.0–2.0 m yr␣1 southward. Shock lithification took place even at the smallest, 11 m crater, but planar fractures (PFs) and undecorated planar deformation features (PDFs), as well as coesite and stishovite, have only been found in shock-lithified material from the two larger craters. Shock-lithified dune sand material shows perfectly preserved sedimentary structures including cross-bedding and animal burrows as well as postimpact structures such as open fractures perpendicular to the bedding, slickensides, and radiating striation resembling shatter cones. The composition of all impact melt glasses can be explained as mixtures of aeolian sand and iron meteorite. We observed a partial decoupling of Fe and Ni in the black impact glass, probably due to partitioning of Ni into unoxidized metal droplets. The absence of a Ca-enriched component demonstrates that the craters did not penetrate the bedrock below the sand sheet, which has an estimated thickness of 20–30 m.

Middle and Late Pleistocene humid periods recorded in palaeolake deposits of the Nafud desert, Saudi Arabia

Present climate in the Nafud desert of northern Saudi Arabia is hyper-arid and moisture brought by north-westerly winds scarcely reaches the region. The existence of abundant palaeolake sediments provides evidence for a considerably wetter climate in the past. However, the existing chronological framework of these deposits is solely based on radiocarbon dating of questionable reliability, due to potential post-depositional contamination with younger 14C. By using luminescence dating, we show that the lake deposits were not formed between 40 and 20 ka as suggested previously, but approximately ca 410 ka, 320 ka, 200 ka, 125 ka, and 100 ka ago. All of these humid phases are in good agreement with those recorded in lake sediments and speleothems from southern Arabia. Surprisingly, no Holocene lake deposits were identified. Geological characteristics of the deposits and diatom analysis suggest that a single, perennial lake covered the entire south-western Nafud ca 320 ka ago. In contrast, lakes of the 200 ka, 125 ka, and 100 ka humid intervals were smaller and restricted to interdune depressions of a pre-existing dune relief. The concurrent occurrence of humid phases in the Nafud, southern Arabia and the eastern Mediterranean suggests that moisture in northern Arabia originated either from the Mediterranean due to more frequent frontal depression systems or from stronger Indian monsoon circulation, respectively. However, based on previously published climate model simulations and palaecolimate evidence from central Arabia and the Negev desert, we argue that humid climate conditions in the Nafud were probably caused by a stronger African monsoon and a distinct change in zonal atmospheric circulation.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

Large-scale land acquisition and its effects on the water balance in investor and host countries

This study examines the validity of the assumption that international large-scale land acquisition (LSLA) is motivated by the desire to secure control over water resources, which is commonly referred to as ‘water grabbing’. This assumption was repeatedly expressed in recent years, ascribing the said motivation to the Gulf States in particular. However, it must be considered of hypothetical nature, as the few global studies conducted so far focused primarily on the effects of LSLA on host countries or on trade in virtual water. In this study, we analyse the effects of 475 intended or concluded land deals recorded in the Land Matrix database on the water balance in both host and investor countries. We also examine how these effects relate to water stress and how they contribute to global trade in virtual water. The analysis shows that implementation of the LSLAs in our sample would result in global water savings based on virtual water trade. At the level of individual LSLA host countries, however, water use intensity would increase, particularly in 15 sub-Saharan states. From an investor country perspective, the analysis reveals that countries often suspected of using LSLA to relieve pressure on their domestic water resources—such as China, India, and all Gulf States except Saudi Arabia—invest in agricultural activities abroad that are less water-intensive compared to their average domestic crop production. Conversely, large investor countries such as the United States, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Japan are disproportionately externalizing crop water consumption through their international land investments. Statistical analyses also show that host countries with abundant water resources are not per se favoured targets of LSLA. Indeed, further analysis reveals that land investments originating in water-stressed countries have only a weak tendency to target areas with a smaller water risk.