A review on bovine besnoitiosis: a disease with economic impact in herd health management, caused by Besnoitia besnoiti (Franco and Borges, 1916).

Bovine besnoitiosis is caused by the largely unexplored apicomplexan parasite Besnoitia besnoiti. In cows, infection during pregnancy often results in abortion, and chronically infected bulls become infertile. Similar to other apicomplexans B. besnoiti has acquired a largely intracellular lifestyle, but its complete life cycle is still unknown, modes of transmission have not been entirely resolved and the definitive host has not been identified. Outbreaks of bovine besnoitiosis in cattle were described in the 1990s in Portugal and Spain, and later several cases were also detected in France. More cases have been reported recently in hitherto unaffected countries, including Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary and Croatia. To date, there is still no effective pharmaceutical compound available for the treatment of besnoitiosis in cattle, and progress in the identification of novel targets for intervention through pharmacological or immunological means is hampered by the lack of molecular data on the genomic and transcriptomic level. In addition, the lack of an appropriate small animal laboratory model, and wide gaps in our knowledge on the host-parasite interplay during the life cycle of this parasite, renders vaccine and drug development a cost- and labour-intensive undertaking.

Saving the Australian War Effort in 1916? The Significance and Impact of Global Climatic Conditions and Pests on William Morris Hughes’ Negotiations with the British Government

Taking up the thesis of Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) that human history (including cultural history) on the one hand and natural history on the other must be brought into conversation more than has been done so in the past, this presentation will focus more closely on the significance and the impact of global climatic conditions and pests on the negotiations that Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes carried on with the British government between March and November 1916. Whereas Australia had been able to sell most of its produce in 1914 and 1915 the situation looked more serious in 1916, not least due to the growing shortage in shipping. It was therefore imperative for the Australian government to find a way to solve this problem, not least because it wanted to keep up its own war effort at the pace it had been going so far. In this context intentions to make or press ahead with a contribution to a war perceived to be more total those of the past interacted with natural phenomena such as the declining harvest in many parts of the world in 1916 as a consequence of climatic conditions as well as pests in many parts of the world.

From the Sea to Paris and back: On the interdependence of economic warfare, weather conditions and the submarine campaign 1916-1917

Starting of from Avner Offer’s comment that the First World War was not only a war of steel and gold, but also of bread and potatoes (1989: 1) and my own research on British as well as Australian preparations for economic warfare and based on sources from the entente as well as the central powers but also from the United States, Canada and Australia, may presentation will focus on the interdependence of the measures taken by entente as well as central power authorities in the second half of 1916. Already a year before both sides had become aware that this war would not only be decided on the battlefield, but that the issues of primary as well as secondary resources would be decisive. Accordingly measures that could strike the enemy in this field were discussed and put into place more and more and this at time, when weather conditions caused a reduction of harvest all over Europe, Northern America and Argentina.