Religion and assisted and non-assisted suicide in Switzerland: National Cohort Study

Background In the 19th century, eminent French sociologist Emile Durkheim found suicide rates to be higher in the Protestant compared with the Catholic cantons of Switzerland. We examined religious affiliation and suicide in modern Switzerland, where assisted suicide is legal. Methods The 2000 census records of 1 722 456 (46.0%) Catholics, 1 565 452 (41.8%) Protestants and 454 397 (12.2%) individuals with no affiliation were linked to mortality records up to December 2005. The association between religious affiliation and suicide, with the Protestant faith serving as the reference category, was examined in Cox regression models. Hazard ratios (HRs) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were adjusted for age, marital status, education, type of household, language and degree of urbanization. Results Suicide rates per 100 000 inhabitants were 19.7 in Catholics (1664 suicides), 28.5 in Protestants (2158 suicides) and 39.0 in those with no affiliation (882 suicides). Associations with religion were modified by age and gender (P < 0.0001). Compared with Protestant men aged 35–64 years, HRs (95% CI) for all suicides were 0.80 (0.73–0.88) in Catholic men and 1.09 (0.98–1.22) in men with no affiliation; and 0.60 (0.53–0.67) and 1.96 (1.69–2.27), respectively, in men aged 65–94 years. Corresponding HRs in women aged 35–64 years were 0.90 (0.80–1.03) and 1.46 (1.25–1.72); and 0.67 (0.59–0.77) and 2.63 (2.22–3.12) in women aged 65–94 years. The association was strongest for suicides by poisoning in the 65–94-year-old age group, the majority of which was assisted: HRs were 0.45 (0.35–0.59) for Catholic men and 3.01 (2.37–3.82) for men with no affiliation; 0.44 (0.36–0.55) for Catholic women and 3.14 (2.51–3.94) for women with no affiliation. Conclusions In Switzerland, the protective effect of a religious affiliation appears to be stronger in Catholics than in Protestants, stronger in older than in younger people, stronger in women than in men, and particularly strong for assisted suicides.

Nursing the fatherland? Hohenzollern statebuilding and the hidden transcript of political resistance in Hanoverian female charity during the Second German Empire

In summer 1866 the Austro-Prussian struggle for supremacy in Germany erupted into open conflict. King Georg V of Hanover sided with other governments loyal to the German Confederation against Prussia, but after initially defeating Prussian forces at Langensalza, he was forced to capitulate. Two days after the battle, on June 29, 1866, the widow of the Hanoverian general Sir Georg Julius von Hartmann told her daughter in no uncertain terms how she felt about the Prussian government and its allies. In her opinion they were nothing more than “robber states” that cloaked their disregard for the Ten Commandments in sanctimonious public displays of piety. “These Protestant Jesuits,” she continued, “offend me more than the Catholic ones. You know that I am German with all my heart and love my Germany, but I cannot consider them genuine Germans anymore because they only want to make Germany Prussian.”

Die katholische Kirche und Moralpolitik in Österreich: Reformdynamiken in der Regulierung von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen und der Anerkennung gleichgeschlechtlicher Partnerschaften

Eine vergleichende Analyse der Regulierung von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen und gleichgeschlechtlichen Partnerschaften in Westeuropa im Zeitraum von 1960 bis 2010 zeigt, dass katholisch geprägte Staaten diese Bereiche grundsätzlich nicht weniger stark liberalisiert haben als andere Länder. Allerdings drosselt der Katholizismus offensichtlich die Geschwindigkeit von Reformprozessen. Auf Basis einer detaillierten explorativen Analyse der Politikentwicklungen in Österreich, das sehr früh die Gesetzgebung zum Schwangerschaftsabbruch lockerte, jedoch bei der Einführung registrierter homosexueller Partnerschaften lange zögerte, leiten wir induktiv theoretische Implikationen ab: Die katholische Kirche kann permissive Reformen so lange verhindern, wie institutionelle und kulturelle Gelegenheitsstrukturen nicht der säkular-liberalen Opposition behilflich sind, erfolgreiches Agenda-Setting zu betreiben und Mehrheiten für einen Politikwechsel zu gewinnen.