Vulnerability to risk among small farmers in Tajikistan: results of a 2011 survey

Tajikistan is judged to be highly vulnerable to risk, including food insecurity risks and climate change risks. By some vulnerability measures it is the most vulnerable among all 28 countries in the World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Region – ECA (World Bank 2009). The rural population, with its relatively high incidence of poverty, is particularly vulnerable. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) in Tajikistan (2011) provided an opportunity to conduct a farm-level survey with the objective of assessing various dimensions of rural population’s vulnerability to risk and their perception of constraints to farming operations and livelihoods. The survey should be accordingly referred to as the 2011 PPCR survey. The rural population in Tajikistan is highly agrarian, with about 50% of family income deriving from agriculture (see Figure 4.1; also LSMS 2007 – own calculations). Tajikistan’s agriculture basically consists of two groups of producers: small household plots – the successors of Soviet “private agriculture” – and dehkan (or “peasant”) farms – new family farming structures that began to be created under relevant legislation passed after 1992 (Lerman and Sedik, 2008). The household plots manage 20% of arable land and produce 65% of gross agricultural output (GAO). Dehkan farms manage 65% of arable land and produce close to 30% of GAO. The remaining 15% of arable land is held in agricultural enterprises – the rapidly shrinking sector of corporate farms that succeeded the Soviet kolkhozes and sovkhozes and today produces less than 10% of GAO (TajStat 2011) The survey conducted in May 2011 focused on dehkan farms, as budgetary constraints precluded the inclusion of household plots. A total of 142 dehkan farms were surveyed in face-to-face interviews. They were sampled from 17 districts across all four regions – Sughd, Khatlon, RRP, and GBAO. The districts were selected so as to represent different agro-climatic zones, different vulnerability zones (based on the World Bank (2011) vulnerability assessment), and different food-insecurity zones (based on WFP/IPC assessments). Within each district, 3-4 jamoats were chosen at random and 2-3 farms were selected in each jamoat from lists provided by jamoat administration so as to maximize the variability by farm characteristics. The sample design by region/district is presented in Table A, which also shows the agro-climatic zone and the food security phase for each district. The sample districts are superimposed on a map of food security phases based on IPC April 2011.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?