Coordinating Platform-Based Multi-Sourcing: Introducing the Theory of Convention

Spurred by the consumer market, companies increasingly deploy smartphones or tablet computers in their operations. However, unlike private users, companies typically struggle to cover their needs with existing applications, and therefore expand mobile software platforms through customized applications from multiple software vendors. Companies thereby combine the concepts of multi-sourcing and software platform ecosystems in a novel platform-based multi-sourcing setting. This implies, however, the clash of two different approaches towards the coordination of the underlying one-to-many inter-organizational relationships. So far, however, little is known about impacts of merging coordination approaches. Relying on convention theory, we addresses this gap by analyzing a platform-based multi-sourcing project between a client and six software vendors, that develop twenty-three custom-made applications on a common platform (Android). In doing so, we aim to understand how unequal coordination approaches merge, and whether and for what reason particular coordination mechanisms, design decisions, or practices disappear, while new ones emerge.

Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Demand for D&O Insurance by Listed Companies

This paper introduces a new rationale for the existence of “Directors’ and Officers’” (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize long run stock market value. We show that D&O insurance provides a convenient instrument for the initial shareholders of a company to take advantage of differences in beliefs between insiders and outsiders in capital markets. The empirical results support the idea that both the insurance coverage and the premium are higher in the presence of new shareholders and volatile markets. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.

How Firms Make Friends: Communities in Private-Collective Innovation

When firms contribute to open source projects, they in fact invest into public goods which may be used by everyone, even by their competitors. This seemingly paradoxical behavior can be explained by the model of private-collective innovation where private investors participate in collective action. Previous literature has shown that companies benefit through the production process providing them with unique incentives such as learning and reputation effects. By contributing to open source projects firms are able to build a network of external individuals and organizations participating in the creation and development of the software. As will be shown in this doctoral dissertation firm-sponsored communities involve the formation of interorganizational relationships which eventually may lead to a source of sustained competitive advantage. However, managing a largely independent open source community is a challenging balancing act between exertion of control to appropriate value creation, and openness in order to gain and preserve credibility and motivate external contributions. Therefore, this dissertation consisting of an introductory chapter and three separate research papers analyzes characteristics of firm-driven open source communities, finds reasons why and mechanisms by which companies facilitate the creation of such networks, and shows how firms can benefit most from their communities.