Real-World Evaluation of Sensor Context-aware Adaptive Duty-cycled Opportunistic Routing

Energy is of primary concern in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Low power transmission makes the wireless links unreliable, which leads to frequent topology changes. Resulting packet retransmissions aggravate the energy consumption. Beaconless routing approaches, such as opportunistic routing (OR) choose packet forwarders after data transmissions, and are promising to support dynamic features of WSNs. This paper proposes SCAD - Sensor Context-aware Adaptive Duty-cycled beaconless OR for WSNs. SCAD is a cross-layer routing solution and it brings the concept of beaconless OR into WSNs. SCAD selects packet forwarders based on multiple types of network contexts. To achieve a balance between performance and energy efficiency, SCAD adapts duty-cycles of sensors based on real-time traffic loads and energy drain rates. We implemented SCAD in TinyOS running on top of Tmote Sky sensor motes. Real-world evaluations show that SCAD outperforms other protocols in terms of both throughput and network lifetime.

Dynamic Transmission Modes to Support Opportunistic Information-Centric Networks

In this paper, we describe dynamic unicast to increase communication efficiency in opportunistic Information-centric networks. The approach is based on broadcast requests to quickly find content and dynamically creating unicast links to content sources without the need of neighbor discovery. The links are kept temporarily as long as they deliver content and are quickly removed otherwise. Evaluations in mobile networks show that this approach maintains ICN flexibility to support seamless mobile communication and achieves up to 56.6% shorter transmission times compared to broadcast in case of multiple concurrent requesters. Apart from that, dynamic unicast unburdens listener nodes from processing unwanted content resulting in lower processing overhead and power consumption at these nodes. The approach can be easily included into existing ICN architectures using only available data structures.

Compact low-power cortical recording architecture for compressive multichannel data acquisition

This paper introduces an area- and power-efficient approach for compressive recording of cortical signals used in an implantable system prior to transmission. Recent research on compressive sensing has shown promising results for sub-Nyquist sampling of sparse biological signals. Still, any large-scale implementation of this technique faces critical issues caused by the increased hardware intensity. The cost of implementing compressive sensing in a multichannel system in terms of area usage can be significantly higher than a conventional data acquisition system without compression. To tackle this issue, a new multichannel compressive sensing scheme which exploits the spatial sparsity of the signals recorded from the electrodes of the sensor array is proposed. The analysis shows that using this method, the power efficiency is preserved to a great extent while the area overhead is significantly reduced resulting in an improved power-area product. The proposed circuit architecture is implemented in a UMC 0.18 [Formula: see text]m CMOS technology. Extensive performance analysis and design optimization has been done resulting in a low-noise, compact and power-efficient implementation. The results of simulations and subsequent reconstructions show the possibility of recovering fourfold compressed intracranial EEG signals with an SNR as high as 21.8 dB, while consuming 10.5 [Formula: see text]W of power within an effective area of 250 [Formula: see text]m × 250 [Formula: see text]m per channel.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.