Compact low-power cortical recording architecture for compressive multichannel data acquisition

This paper introduces an area- and power-efficient approach for compressive recording of cortical signals used in an implantable system prior to transmission. Recent research on compressive sensing has shown promising results for sub-Nyquist sampling of sparse biological signals. Still, any large-scale implementation of this technique faces critical issues caused by the increased hardware intensity. The cost of implementing compressive sensing in a multichannel system in terms of area usage can be significantly higher than a conventional data acquisition system without compression. To tackle this issue, a new multichannel compressive sensing scheme which exploits the spatial sparsity of the signals recorded from the electrodes of the sensor array is proposed. The analysis shows that using this method, the power efficiency is preserved to a great extent while the area overhead is significantly reduced resulting in an improved power-area product. The proposed circuit architecture is implemented in a UMC 0.18 [Formula: see text]m CMOS technology. Extensive performance analysis and design optimization has been done resulting in a low-noise, compact and power-efficient implementation. The results of simulations and subsequent reconstructions show the possibility of recovering fourfold compressed intracranial EEG signals with an SNR as high as 21.8 dB, while consuming 10.5 [Formula: see text]W of power within an effective area of 250 [Formula: see text]m × 250 [Formula: see text]m per channel.

Efficient luminescent solar concentrators based on self-absorption free, Tm2+ doped halides

The optical and luminescence properties of CaI2 and NaCl doped with divalent thulium are reported for solar energy applications. These halides strongly absorb solar light from the UV up to 900 nm due to the intense Tm2+ 4f13→4f125d1 electronic transitions. Absorption is followed by emission of 1140 nm light due to the 2F5/2→2F7/2 transition of the 4f13 configuration that can be efficiently converted to electric power by thin film CuInSe2 (CIS) solar cells. Because of a negligible spectral overlap between absorption and emission spectra, a luminescent solar concentrator (LSC) based on these black luminescent materials would not suffer from self-absorption losses. The Tm2+ doped halides may therefore lead to efficient semi-transparent power generating windows that absorb solar light over the whole visible spectrum. It will be shown that the power efficiency of the Tm2+ based LSCs can be up to four times higher compared to LSCs based on organic dyes or quantum dots.

Comparing reading processes on e-ink displays and print

E-book reading devices open new possibilities in the field of reading. More activities than just reading a book can be performed with a single electronic device. For a long time, electronic reading devices have not been favored because their active LCD displays used to have a relatively low contrast. The new generation of electronic reading devices differs from earlier ones in the nature of the display: active LCD displays have been replaced with displays based on e-ink technology, which has display properties closer to that of printed paper. Moreover, e-ink technology has higher power efficiency, thereby increasing battery life and reducing weight. At first sight, the display looks similar to paper print, but the question remains whether the reading behavior also is equal to that of reading a printed book. In the present study, we analyzed and compared reading behavior on e-reader displays and on printed paper. The results suggest that the reading behavior on e-readers is indeed very similar to the reading behavior on print. Participants shared similar proportions of regressive saccades while reading on e-readers and print. Significant differences in fixation duration suggest that e-readers, in some situations, may even provide better legibility.

Enhancing IEEE 802.11 Energy Efficiency for Continuous Media Applications

This paper proposes the Optimized Power save Algorithm for continuous Media Applications (OPAMA) to improve end-user device energy efficiency. OPAMA enhances the standard legacy Power Save Mode (PSM) of IEEE 802.11 by taking into consideration application specific requirements combined with data aggregation techniques. By establishing a balanced cost/benefit tradeoff between performance and energy consumption, OPAMA is able to improve energy efficiency, while keeping the end-user experience at a desired level. OPAMA was assessed in the OMNeT++ simulator using real traces of variable bitrate video streaming applications. The results showed the capability to enhance energy efficiency, achieving savings up to 44% when compared with the IEEE 802.11 legacy PSM.

Yellow laser light generation by frequency doubling of the output from a master oscillator fiber power amplifier system

We present a power-scalable approach for yellow laser-light generation based on standard Ytterbium (Yb) doped fibers. To force the cavity to lase at 1154 nm, far above the gain-maximum, measures must be taken to fulfill lasing condition and to suppress competing amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) in the high-gain region. To prove the principle we built a fiber-laser cavity and a fiber-amplifier both at 1154 nm. In between cavity and amplifier we suppressed the ASE by 70 dB using a fiber Bragg grating (FBG) based filter. Finally we demonstrated efficient single pass frequency doubling to 577 nm with a periodically poled lithium niobate crystal (PPLN). With our linearly polarized 1154 nm master oscillator power fiber amplifier (MOFA) system we achieved slope efficiencies of more than 15 % inside the cavity and 24 % with the fiber-amplifier. The frequency doubling followed the predicted optimal efficiency achievable with a PPLN crystal. So far we generated 1.5 W at 1154nm and 90 mW at 577 nm. Our MOFA approach for generation of 1154 nm laser radiation is power-scalable by using multi-stage amplifiers and large mode-area fibers and is therefore very promising for building a high power yellow laser-light source of several tens of Watt.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.