Estimating market access in non-GPA countries: A suggested methodology

The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) has data reporting obligations for all its Contracting Parties. Submitting such data promotes transparency in public procurement and also signals tendencies towards discrimination. However, most developing countries, especially emerging economies, are non-members of the GPA and therefore have no comparable data reporting obligations. In most cases, this has led to an absence of any reliable data on these countries’ public purchases, which poses a serious challenge in international negotiations on the subject and in examining the impact of protectionist measures in these countries’ public markets. In this short paper, we attempt to overcome these data challenges by developing a methodology to estimate the size of procurement markets in non-GPA countries as well as foreign market access therein. We also show the results from this methodology for estimating the EU’s access in select emerging economies’ public markets.

Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical character- istic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenar- ios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm adver- tises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative ad- vertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative advertis- ing firms do not advertise when the informational value to consumers is small.

Market Access in Switzerland and in the European Union for Agricultural Products from Least Developed Countries

The introduction of the so-called “duty free quota free” treatment (DFQF) for all products from least developed countries (LDCs), in particular by the European Communities (EC) and by Switzerland, raised expectations of increased agricultural exports for these 49 countries. Despite the high tariff differential LDCs now enjoy over their competitors, especially for agricultural products and particularly in Switzerland, the results until 2007 are dismal: with the exception of sugar exports to the EC, LDCs have not been able to substantially increase their agricultural exports to Europe. This study analyses the result-ing tariff situation and the remaining non-tariff barriers. In many instances it is not cus-toms duties but the sanitary and phytosanitary barriers which turn out to be the single most important hurdle preventing trade. For instance, almost no LDC-based company can supply animal-based products. Similarly, certain private standards set by proces-sors and retailers prevent imports, particularly from LDCs, far more effectively than tar-iffs. Several gateways into this “European cordon sanitaire” are proposed. Only if offered in the context of a package of various carefully coordinated measures, DFQF could yet have a real impact on trade from LDCs. As it stands, this treatment constitutes only a nice-to-have but still largely ineffective instrument of trade development.