Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Subjective stress in female elite athletes and non-athletes: Evidence from cortisol analyses

Stress response can be considered a consequence of psychological or physiological threats to the human organism. Elevated cortisol secretion represents a biological indicator of subjective stress. The extent of subjectively experienced stress depends on individual coping strategies or self-regulation skills. Because of their experience with competitive pressure, athletes might show less pronounced biological stress responses during stressful events compared to non-athletes. In the present study, the short version of the Berlin Intelligence Structure Test, a paper-pencil intelligence test, was used as an experimental stressor. Cortisol responses of 26 female Swiss elite athletes and 26 female non-athlete controls were compared. Salivary free cortisol responses were measured 15 minutes prior to, as well as immediately before and after psychometric testing. In both groups, a significant effect of time was found: High cortisol levels prior to testing decreased significantly during the testing session. Furthermore, athletes exhibited reliably lower cortisol levels than non-athlete controls. No significant interaction effects could be observed. The overall pattern of results supports the idea that elite athletes show a less pronounced cortisol-related stress response due to more efficient coping strategies.

Japanese-US common-arm analysis of paclitaxel plus carboplatin in advanced non-small-cell lung cancer: a model for assessing population-related pharmacogenomics

PURPOSE To explore whether population-related pharmacogenomics contribute to differences in patient outcomes between clinical trials performed in Japan and the United States, given similar study designs, eligibility criteria, staging, and treatment regimens. METHODS We prospectively designed and conducted three phase III trials (Four-Arm Cooperative Study, LC00-03, and S0003) in advanced-stage, non-small-cell lung cancer, each with a common arm of paclitaxel plus carboplatin. Genomic DNA was collected from patients in LC00-03 and S0003 who received paclitaxel (225 mg/m(2)) and carboplatin (area under the concentration-time curve, 6). Genotypic variants of CYP3A4, CYP3A5, CYP2C8, NR1I2-206, ABCB1, ERCC1, and ERCC2 were analyzed by pyrosequencing or by PCR restriction fragment length polymorphism. Results were assessed by Cox model for survival and by logistic regression for response and toxicity. Results Clinical results were similar in the two Japanese trials, and were significantly different from the US trial, for survival, neutropenia, febrile neutropenia, and anemia. There was a significant difference between Japanese and US patients in genotypic distribution for CYP3A4*1B (P = .01), CYP3A5*3C (P = .03), ERCC1 118 (P < .0001), ERCC2 K751Q (P < .001), and CYP2C8 R139K (P = .01). Genotypic associations were observed between CYP3A4*1B for progression-free survival (hazard ratio [HR], 0.36; 95% CI, 0.14 to 0.94; P = .04) and ERCC2 K751Q for response (HR, 0.33; 95% CI, 0.13 to 0.83; P = .02). For grade 4 neutropenia, the HR for ABCB1 3425C-->T was 1.84 (95% CI, 0.77 to 4.48; P = .19). CONCLUSION Differences in allelic distribution for genes involved in paclitaxel disposition or DNA repair were observed between Japanese and US patients. In an exploratory analysis, genotype-related associations with patient outcomes were observed for CYP3A4*1B and ERCC2 K751Q. This common-arm approach facilitates the prospective study of population-related pharmacogenomics in which ethnic differences in antineoplastic drug disposition are anticipated.

Factors of Home Dream Recall and Nightmare Frequency in a Non-Student Sample

Home dream recall frequencies and nightmare frequencies show great inter-individual differences. Most of the studies trying to explain these differences, however, studied young participants, so these findings might not be true for persons older than 25 years. The present study investigated the relationship between dream recall, nightmare frequency, age, gender, sleep parameters, stress, and subjective health in a community-based sample (N = 455) with a mean age of about 55 years. Some of the factors that have been shown to be associated with dream recall and nightmare frequency were also associated with these variables in non-student sample like frequency of nocturnal awakenings, current stress, and tiredness during the day. We were not able to replicate the effect of sex-role orientation on dream recall and nightmare frequency, supporting the idea that age might mediate the effect of daytime variables on dream recall and nightmare frequency. As nightmare frequency was related to sleep quality, stress, health problems, and tiredness during the day, it would be desirable that clinicians include a question about nightmares in their anamneses.

Implicit Motives of Elite Athletes, Sport Students, and Non-Sport Students: Power, Affiliation, and Achievement

Research on performance and participation in (elite) sports has predominantly focused on variables relating to the achievement motive. However, some authors describe that athletes in interactive sports (e.g. tennis) are assumed to exhibit a strong power motive in order to win competitive matches, usually resulting in the demonstration of dominance or the experience of inferiority. The affiliation motive, by contrast, is not functional in elite sports due to their competitive rather than social character. In the present chapter we discuss how the three basic implicit motives of power, affiliation, and achievement relate to the sports field and describe how they can affect athletes’ performance. We present empirical evidence for the existence of different strengths of the three basic motives in three studies with elite athletes (Study 1), non-elite athletes (sport students, Study 2), and non-sport students infrequently involved in sports (Study 3). Our results suggest that elite athletes show higher levels of the implicit power motive compared to sport students, who in turn have higher power motives than non-sport students. Surprisingly, elite athletes do not differ from non-sport students regarding their implicit achievement motive. Moreover, non-sport students exhibit higher implicit affiliation motive scores than sport students and elite athletes. We propose that research on motivational processes of highly competitive athletes should – in addition to the achievement motive – focus more on motive themes like the implicit motives of power and affiliation.